Research report

Civil Society against Corruption in Ukraine:

Political Roles, Advocacy Strategies, and Impact

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Main research questions and methodological approach

Our research has addressed the central research questions of theme 1 (Political roles of CSOs in LLMICs), as formulated in annex 2 of the Assumptions call for proposals:

- How do different types of CSOs contribute differently (by performing various political roles and advocacy strategies) to changing or maintaining power relations?
- What explains their success or failure?

As our research has focused on anti-corruption in activism in Ukraine, our central *research question* has been: What explains the success and failure of anti-corruption activism in Ukraine? Our research has clear implications for the work of international assistance practitioners interested in supporting the fight against corruption in Ukraine. Our central *policy question*, accordingly, has been: What are the implications of our research for international assistance to anti-corruption activism in Ukraine? Our research has also allowed us to scrutinize three core assumptions of the theory of change of the Dialogue & Dissent program (see next section for how our findings relate to these assumptions):

- Assumption 1: CSOs perform 4 types of political roles to change power relations: educational (internal & external); communicative (linking state & society); representational (voice & resistance); cooperative (subsidiarity & coordination)
- Assumption 2: Different roles require different organizational forms, capacities and different forms of legitimacy.
- Assumption 3: When pressured, informed and/or persuaded by CSOs, states and companies change their policies and practices, and societal groups change their norms, values and practices to be more sustainable, equitable and inclusive.

The theory of change of the Dialogue & Dissent program highlights three (sets of) variables that are associated with the effectiveness of CSOs seeking to change power relations: the type(s) of political role that they perform; the advocacy strategies that they choose; their organizational form. These variables have been central to our investigation into the effectiveness of anti-corruption activism in Ukraine.

Our research strategy has been to first identify factors that are associated with success of anti-corruption activism around the world. To this end, we have conducted a review of some five hundred academic and practitioner publications on anti-corruption activism. In addition to identifying the 'determinants of effectiveness' of anti-corruption activism, the literature review has also focused on the issue of how CSOs can contribute to fighting corruption, and which instruments they employ in their fight. Our literature review was published under the title *Civil Society and Anti-Corruption: an Overview of the Literature*.

Through the literature review we have found that factors associated with success in anti-corruption activism fall under three broad categories: environmental factors, advocacy strategies of civil society organizations, and their organizational characteristics. Environmental factors are outside the direct control of civil society organizations and are in most cases related to the political, institutional, and legislative context in which they operate. The environmental factor that is most frequently highlighted in studies of anti-corruption activism is the existence of political will among relevant political authorities. The second set of insights regarding the effectiveness of anti-corruption activism concerns advocacy strategies. These insights are related to the timing of advocacy efforts, their sustainability, concreteness of objectives, cooperation among anti-corruption CSOs, and, most relevant to the context of Ukraine, the existence of a confrontational

or cooperative relationship with local authorities. The third set of factors associated with success of anti-corruption activism, finally, relates to their organizational characteristics, including capacity - understood here as human and financial resources - and the extent of grassroots support. These factors are closely aligned to the (sets of) variables from the theory of change of the Dialogue & Dissent program. There is little explicit reference to 'political roles' in academic and practitioner literature about anti-corruption activism. The performance by CSOs of a representational role, however, is related to the presence among CSOs of grassroots support and in that sense falls under the third set of factors as distinguished above. The performance by CSOs of a cooperative role, especially as it relates to cooperation with state authorities, is related to variation in advocacy strategies between a confrontational or cooperative stance towards authorities.

Concurrent with our work on the literature review, we started collecting data on CSOs across Ukraine that are involved in fighting corruption. We have identified CSOs of potential interest through monitoring of traditional and social media, hundreds of phone calls, and from lists of recipients of foreign assistance provided to us by donors. Soon after the completion of the literature review, in May 2018, we started our fieldwork in the regions of Ukraine. Altogether we have conducted 241 interviews in 57 cities and towns in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea. The interviews that we have conducted were confidential semi-structured interviews for which we used a standard questionnaire while leaving room for further reflection and analysis by our interlocutors.

We have also collected data on the anti-corruption CSOs that we interviewed by monitoring their social media accounts and studying their publications and reports. Based on the data obtained during interviews and desk research, we have created a rich dataset containing information about, among other things, the political roles, advocacy strategies, organizational characteristics, and types of impact of all 241 anti-corruption organizations. The dataset has served as the basis for our analysis of the factors associated with success of anti-corruption activism in Ukraine.

Our research has resulted in the following publications:

- Bader, Max. Oksana Huss, Andriy Meleshevych, Oksana Nesterenko. *Громадянське суспільство проти корупції в України*. Kyiv: Dukh i Litera, 2019
- Bader, Max, Oksana Huss, Andriy Meleshevych, Oksana Nesterenko. *When does Anti-Corruption Activism in Ukraine have Impact? Lessons for International Assistance*. Leiden University and Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre of National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2019
- Бадер, Макс, Оксана Гус, Андрій Мелешевич, Оксана Нестеренко. *Коли антикорупційний активізм в Україні має вплив? Уроки для міжнародної підтримки*. Leiden University and Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre of National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2019
- Bader, Max Oksana Huss, Andriy Meleshevych, Oksana Nesterenko. *Civil Society against Corruption in Ukraine: Pathways to Impact*. Leiden University and Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre of National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2019
- Бадер, Макс, Оксана Гус, Андрій Мелешевич, Оксана Нестеренко. *Громадянське суспільство проти корупції в Україні: способи впливу*. Leiden University and Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre of National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2019
- Huss, Oksana, Max Bader, Andriy Meleshevych, Oksana Nesterenko. *Analysing contextual factors for anti-corruption activism in the regions of Ukraine*. Leiden University and Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre of National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2019

- Гус, Оксана, Макс Бадер, Андрій Мелешевич, Оксана Нестеренко. *Аналіз контекстуальних факторів, що впливають на антикорупційну діяльність в регіонах України*. Leiden University and Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre of National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2019
- Nesterenko, Oksana, Max Bader, Oksana Huss, Andriy Meleshevych. *Civil Society against Corruption in the Regions of Ukraine: Recommendations for International Assistance*. Leiden University and Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre of National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2019
- Нестеренко, Оксана, Макс Бадер, Оксана Гус, Андрій Мелешевич. *Громадянське суспільство проти корупції в регіонах України: рекомендації щодо міжнародної допомоги*. Leiden University and Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre of National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2019
- Bader, Max, Denitsa Marchevska, Kira Mössinger. *Civil Society and Anti-Corruption: an Overview of the Literature*, March 2018

Contribution of the project to knowledge and understanding on the Assumptions of the Theory of Change

The activities of anti-corruption CSOs in the regions of Ukraine fall under six categories: monitoring and reporting, awareness-raising, advocacy, direct action, capacity-building, and co-governance. The graph below shows which of these types of activities are most common among anti-corruption organizations in the regions of Ukraine and provides examples of these activities.

118
ORGANIZATIONS VIEW AWARENESS-RAISING AS A CORE ACTIVITY.

» An organization from Chernivtsi investigated the involvement of the State Customs Service in smuggling in the Chernivtsi region and widely disseminated its findings in local media. «

44
ORGANIZATIONS ARE ENGAGED IN ADVOCACY FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AND PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS.

» As part of the fight against cash bribes in hospitals, an organization from Ternopil lobbied for the installation of payment terminals. «

70
ORGANIZATIONS USE DIRECT ACTION SUCH AS PROTESTS AND FILING LAWSUITS

» An organization from Mariupol delivered a funeral wreath to the governor of the Donetsk region to protest corruption related to pollution. «

109
ORGANIZATIONS CONDUCT MONITORING OF PUBLIC POLICY OR ASSET DECLARATIONS BY PUBLIC SERVANTS.

» An organization from Dnipro found evidence corruption in the asset declarations of the leadership of the Dnipro regional branch of the State Agency of Motor Roads of Ukraine. «

52
ORGANIZATIONS ENGAGE IN CAPACITY-BUILDING TO FIGHT CORRUPTION.

» An organization from Khmilnyk trained public officials in municipalities of the Vinnytsia region about conflicts of interest. «

6
ORGANIZATIONS HAVE BECOME INVOLVED IN PUBLIC GOVERNANCE ALONGSIDE STATE AUTHORITIES (CO-GOVERNANCE)

» An organization from Cherkasy was invited by local authorities to take part in an attestation commission that hired new police officers. «

The anti-corruption organizations are confronted with a multitude of challenges, but many of them are able to point to examples of real impact. In our analysis of the different types of impact that anti-corruption CSOs in Ukraine create, we have distinguished between counteracting corruption as it occurs (ex post anti-corruption) and preventing corruption from occurring in the first place (ex ante anti-corruption). During interviews, our interlocutors have presented 193 examples of impact, including 134 examples of ex post anti-corruption and 59 examples of ex ante anti-corruption. The most common type of ex post anti-corruption effect (52 cases) concerns the initiation of criminal investigations or prosecution of corrupt individuals or firms based on information provided by activists. Another common type of ex post effect (22 cases) is the annulment

of a public procurement following a publication or an official appeal by activists. Interlocutors have also presented examples of corrupt or corruption-prone decisions of local or regional authorities having been rolled back thanks to their efforts. An organization from Odesa, for instance, has successfully challenged the city's annual budget on grounds that it was prone to corruption. In another example, an organization from Marhanets has accomplished that assets that were illegally privatized assets by the city's authorities were returned to the state. A final type of ex post anti-corruption effect resulting from the work of civil society organizations in the regions of Ukraine that is common (27 cases) is the dismissal of corrupt officials. In Kropyvnytskyi, for instance, anti-corruption activists have been successful in forcing the dismissal of local officials in charge of public utilities. And in the cities of Ukrayinka and Sviatohirsk, activists have taken credit for leading anti-corruption campaigns that forced the mayor of the city out of office. Less common are examples of ex ante anti-corruption effects. Interlocutors have mentioned 59 cases in which legislation or regulations have been adopted or amended with the goal to prevent corruption and as a result of their efforts. In seven municipalities in the Ivano-Frankivsk region, for instance, anti-corruption instruments were adopted following trainings on integrity in public administration conducted by an organization from Ivano-Frankivsk. In a similar example, an advocacy effort by an organization from Khmelnytskyi resulted in the adoption by the city council of a new regulation on conflicts of interest. An organization from Kherson successfully lobbied the introduction of more transparency in tenders by universities in the city. And in several cities, including Chuhuiv, Kharkiv, Kherson, Khmilnyk, and Severodonetsk, activists have been successful in persuading the local authorities to lower the threshold for the use of the electronic procurement system ProZorro.

Our research suggests that anti-corruption CSOs in Ukraine face two key dilemmas in their struggle to create impact. First, many organizations lack sufficient capacity to be effective. 57% of anti-corruption organizations in our dataset function without any type of funding beyond voluntary contributions of core activists. The funding of other organizations typically comes in the form of grants from foreign governments, non-governmental organizations, and foundations. With few exceptions, however, such grants are small and cover a short period. Given a lack of substantial funding, anti-corruption organizations cannot hire necessary staff and services, and have fewer opportunities to acquire knowledge and skills that could help make their work more effective. The second dilemma that anti-corruption CSOs in the regions of Ukraine face is the the absence of broad base of support. As we found in our literature review, in some other (national) contexts anti-corruption CSOs are broad-based organizations. Where this is the case, anti-corruption CSOs are more effective in mobilizing supporters and have a greater degree of legitimacy to promote change. Through their actions, some of these organizations can ultimately increase the political will of the authorities to fight corruption. And in cases of co-governance with the authorities, such as in participatory budgeting mechanisms, they can even blur the line between civil society and government. Anti-corruption organizations in Ukraine, by contrast, are far from the type of broad community-based organizations that exist in some other countries. Most of them instead rely on the dedication of, usually, between one and five activists, while membership is more often than not ephemeral. Because they do not have a substantial base of support, anti-corruption organizations, like many other types of civil society organizations in Ukraine, cannot mobilize supporters to help them advance their cause and are often seen as lacking legitimacy to promote change for the public good.

Our findings show that the anti-corruption organizations that are most effective tend to be those that convincingly solve either one of the two dilemmas. Some organizations solve the capacity dilemma by attracting sustained and substantial funding, typically in the form of international assistance, allowing them

to hire a core staff, purchase professional services, and engage in multi-year planning. Organizations with multiple grants or a large institutional grant tend to pursue a multipronged approach employing diverse methods of activism and addressing more than one type of corruption. While many organizations with weaker financial capacity can point to one or two examples of impact, one organization from Kharkiv with substantial funding, for instance, within only a few years has won a range of court cases, has successfully advocated a new procurement policy at the regional administration, and has secured the annulment of many tenders. Other organizations solve the support dilemma by drawing from a real base of support, such as the workers of an organization or a group of people directly affected by a certain type of abuse. An organization from the Ternopil region which was established by local fishermen and which focuses environmental issues and the illegal use natural resources, for instance, has won a number of court cases. In another example, an organization from the Donetsk region established by workers from one of the city's main enterprises has been effective in uncovering corruption at the enterprise. There are in practice few organizations that solve both dilemmas: organizations with substantial professional capacity do not draw from major grassroots support, while activists with a grassroots organization struggle to build a professional organization or have no interest in doing so. Our findings, consequently, suggest that there are different and in practice mutually exclusive pathways to impact. We also find that political will among local authorities is an important conducive factor to the effectiveness of anti-corruption activism as it creates, in particular through advocacy efforts, more opportunities for impact. As noted, we have distinguished between counteracting corruption as it occurs (ex post anti-corruption) and preventing corruption from occurring in the first place (ex ante anti-corruption). Achieving ex ante anti-corruption effects requires some degree of constructive interaction with local authorities, and hence political will. Altogether our interlocutors have mentioned 59 examples of concrete impact through advocacy for which political will among authorities was vital. Especially impressive examples of such successful advocacy include the adoption by city councils in Kropyvnytskyi and Dnipro of a set of anti-corruption regulations that were drafted and proposed by activists and the creation of an integrity bureau at the city council in Lutsk. Political will also enables certain forms of cooperation with relevant authorities, for example through memorandums of understanding or memorandums of cooperation. While anti-corruption activists can be effective using confrontational methods, effects that result from cooperation with authorities on average are more substantial and sustainable. We expect that these findings are relevant to other types of CSOs in Ukraine that fulfill political roles, such as human rights organizations and policy advocacy organizations. The context in which anti-corruption CSOs operate is characterized by a combination of few restrictions on the functioning of CSOs and limited civic engagement, as well as a clear stated commitment on the part of the government to fight corruption coupled with strong resistance to this fight from vested interests. We expect that our findings are relevant for anti-corruption CSOs in similar societal contexts. By extension, we expect that our findings are less relevant to societal contexts where there is more civic engagement, such as in the form of community-based organizations, and where there are more legal or political restrictions on the functioning of CSOs.

How do our findings relate to the three assumptions of the Dialogue and Dissent framework?

Assumption 1: CSOs perform 4 types of political roles to change power relations: educational (internal & external); communicative (linking state & society); representational (voice & resistance); cooperative (subsidiarity & coordination)

Our dataset contains information about how many organizations perform the political roles listed under assumption 1. The educational role has an internal and external dimension. The internal role relates to internal organizational processes of membership participation. Given that anti-corruption CSOs in Ukraine typically work with a very small group of staff, members, and volunteers, few perform an internal educational role on a significant scale. The external dimension targets people outside the organizations. 52 organizations in our dataset are engaged in some type of educational activity, but this tends to be only a relatively small part of their overall activity. The communicative role of CSOs, to cite the theory of change, 'refers to the idea that civil society protects a democratic public sphere where citizens can join in debating the issues that affect their lives'. There are more important channels and platforms for public deliberation than CSOs in Ukraine, which has a pluralist media landscape and relatively few restrictions on freedom of speech. While in individual cases it is a matter of interpretation if CSOs perform a communicative role, they certainly do not serve as a major channel of communication between society and state authorities.

The representational role refers to CSOs scrutinizing government outside the usual political process. Nearly all anti-corruption CSOs in Ukraine claim to represent the public's interests against those of the state and in that sense act as a countervailing power. Most of their activities are ostensibly aimed at defending the public interest: 108 of the CSOs in our dataset conduct some type of monitoring, 118 CSOs are engaged in awareness-raising activites, 44 CSOs engage in advocacy, and 70 CSOs use the instrument of direct action. Given that they have few members and volunteers, receive few financial contributions from citizens, have little name recognition, and enjoy little public trust, few of these CSOs, however, in a meaningful sense represent actual groups in society. Some anti-corruption CSOs nonetheless have a credible base of support, and this base of support enables them to be more effective. An organization from Mariupol consisting of workers from one of the city's major enterprises, for instance, has been effective in uncovering corruption at the enterprise and raising awareness about the corruption. In another example, an organization from Ternopil which was established by local fishermen and which focuses on the issue of poaching and other forms of illegal use of water bodies, has won a number of court cases. And in Dnipro, a grassroots organization that focuses on corruption related to road safety receives much appraisal for its awareness-raising efforts and has been successful in holding corrupt actors to account.

CSOs perform a cooperative political role when they act as partners of the government, for instance through alternative modes of governance, or other types of actors. We find that whether anti-corruption CSOs in Ukraine adopt a confronational or cooperative stance towards local authorities hinges mostly on the extent of political will among those authorities to fight corruption. There is great variation across Ukraine in the extent of political will among local and regional authorities to fight corruption. Regional capitals with a relatively high degree of political will among the local authorities include Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lutsk, Kropyvnytskyi, and Rivne. In cities such as Kharkiv, Odesa, Ternopil, Uzhhorod, and Zaporizhzhia, by contrast, political will to address corruption, according to interlocutors among anti-corruption activists, is mostly absent. Whether or not the attitude to corruption of local authorities is aligned with that of anti-corruption activists has major implications for the advocacy strategies that activists pursue. The existence of political will among local

authorities allows for the application of non-confrontational methods such as advocacy, which relies on successful persuasion and eventual consent, and expressly cooperative formats such as co-governance. Successful examples (see above) of advocacy campaigns and co-governance activities illustrate that the presence of political will among local authorities to address corruption creates more opportunities for activists to generate impact.

Assumption 2: Different roles require different organizational forms, capacities
and different forms of legitimacy.

As noted, only organizations with a real base of support can credibly perform a representational political role. A real base of support in this case does not necessarily imply the existence of an extensive membership base, but can instead take the form of a dedicated group of people bound by a shared interest. It has been widely argued in academic and practitioner literature that foreign funding of CSOs can undermine the grassroots nature of local initiatives as it often leads to the emergence of a class of professional, grant-seeking NGOs that are disconnected from the public. From this perspective, lack of foreign funding may be beneficial to CSOs that are based on real grassroots support. Civil society organizations engaging in advocacy efforts, especially when their activities are funded through foreign grants, often have a negative reputation in Ukraine as they are seen as lacking legitimacy. Organizations that are more informally organized and that have a genuine grassroots base of support do not suffer as much from this type of popular bias. It can be therefore beneficial for CSO that perform a representational not to seek formal registration and not to receive foreign funding. At the same time, the effectiveness of such CSOs is impaired by a lack of capacity. Lacking foreign funding, these CSOs, for instance, cannot hire a core staff, purchase professional services, and engage in multi-year planning. In our project publications we suggest that the capacity of these CSOs can be strengthened by creating vertical linkages between these CSOs and (typically) Kyiv-based anti-corruption organizations with much stronger capacity.

In order to perform a representational role, CSOs primarily need to have a credible base of support, while it is less important for these CSOs to be professionally organized. CSOs carrying out a cooperative role, on the other hand, clearly benefit from having strong capacity. The cooperative political role is in most cases performed by anti-corruption CSOs through advocacy or co-governance. These types of activities require a professional staff, the ability to purchase professional services such as legal assistance, and the ability to plan activities beyond the immediate future. In the context of Ukraine, authorities only interact with organizations that are formally registered by the Ministry of Justice. Only formally registered organizations therefore can achieve the types of impact associated with a cooperative role. We find that, in the context of anti-corruption CSOs in Ukraine, only CSOs with substantial foreign funding possess sufficient capacity to effectively engage in activities such as advocacy or co-governance. In order to increase the number of high-capacity CSOs, we suggest in our publications that practitioners of international assistance should prioritize substantial, multi-year funding to select organizations over small grants scattered across a larger number of organizations. In order to receive foreign funding, anti-corruption CSOs in practice must be formally registered. Besides creating opportunities for interaction with the authorities, another reason why many organizations performing a cooperative role prefer to carry out their activities with formal registration therefore is that this allows them to receive foreign funding.

Assumption 3: When pressured, informed and/or persuaded by CSOs, states and companies change their policies and practices, and societal groups change their norms, values and practices to be more sustainable, equitable and inclusive.

Our research contains ample evidence that CSOs can indeed create substantial impact. Especially impressive examples of advocacy campaigns, for instance, include the adoption by city councils in Kropyvnytskyi and Dnipro of a set of anti-corruption regulations that were drafted and proposed by activists, and the creation of an integrity bureau at the city council in Lutsk. Equally impressive examples of impact through co-governance, include, for instance, the cooperation of CSOs in Drohobych and Lviv with city authorities to introduce e-government instruments. Most CSO in our dataset, however, struggle to create impact, even when they can generally point to at least one or a few concrete examples of impact of their work. Among the reasons for their limited effectiveness they most often mention a lack of financial and human resources, passivity among the public, and intimidation from the side of the authorities or others, often in the form of violence, damage of property, or threats. Our research has generated insights into the conditions under which CSO are to a greater or smaller extent likely to be successful in their anti-corruption activism. The insights suggest that there are different pathways to impact, which implies that there is not one particular political role, one particular advocacy strategy, or one particular organizational form that is most of all associated with impact. One pathway is through attracting substantial funding, typically from foreign donors. Another pathway is through relying on a credible base of support. In addition, we find that the presence of political will among local authorities can be greatly conducive to creating impact. There are, in other words, relatively specific conditions under which CSOs are most likely to create impact. These insights have a number of implications for practitioners of international assistance interested in supporting the fight against corruption in Ukraine.

Policy recommendations

As noted, we expect that our findings are relevant to other types of CSOs in Ukraine that fulfill political roles, such as human rights organizations and policy advocacy organizations. We also expect that our findings are relevant for anti-corruption CSOs in a similar societal context as Ukraine's, characterized by a combination of few restrictions on the functioning of CSOs and limited civic engagement, and by a clear stated commitment on the part of the government to fight corruption coupled with strong resistance to this fight from vested interests. We expect that our findings are less relevant to societal contexts where there is more civic engagement, such as in the form of community-based organizations, and where there are more legal or political restrictions on the functioning of CSOs than in Ukraine. Our findings carry a number of implications for practitioners of (international) assistance.

- What types of effects can be achieved in anti-corruption activism and which activities generate more effect depends on the local political context and especially on the extent of political will among among authorities. Where cooperation with local authorities is not possible because of a lack of political will, anti-corruption organizations have little choice but to employ confrontational methods such as monitoring of (potentially) corrupt actors, awareness-raising about corruption, and direct action including the filing of lawsuits and the organization of demonstrations. Where, on the other hand, cooperation with local authorities is possible, anti-corruption organizations are comparatively likely to achieve impact through advocacy and can even become involved in governance. International

- assistance is therefore more likely to create impact when decisions about funding are based on substantial knowledge of the local political environment.

- The often small and short-term grants that anti-corruption organizations in Ukraine receive from foreign donors accentuate rather than solve their capacity dilemma, as the grants do not allow to hire a core staff and otherwise build a professional organization. Once such grants expire, the activism moreover is in most cases interrupted. International assistance is therefore more likely to be effective when it prioritizes institutional, multi-year funding to select organizations over small grants scattered across a larger number of organizations.

- We have found that in a select number of cities, civil society organizations benefit from working through coalitions that are supported by providers of international assistance. By working with other organizations in advocacy campaigns and awareness-raising efforts, anti-corruption activists are often mre successful in achieving impact. Coalitions also go some way towards solving the capacity shortcomings of individual civil society organizations. Practitioners of assistance should consider facailitating the creation of coalitions, among other things through financial assistance, in a broader range of cities across Ukraine.

- While capacity for the anti-corruption organizations outside Kyiv is mostly determined by material resources, they also often lack, by their own admission, necessary professional skills and knowledge. At the same time, a small number of Kyiv-based anti-corruption organizations do possess the professional capacity to effectively carry out anti-corruption activism through, among other things, advocacy, raising awareness, and conducting investigations. A potentially productive avenue of international assistance is to help facilitate the transfer of knowledge and skills from higher-capacity anti-corruption organizations to lower-capacity organizations.

Reflection on the analytical framework

Our analytical framework has not changed relative to the original research proposal. The principal units of analysis in our research have been civil society organizations that are in one way or another involved in fighting corruption in the regions of Ukraine. The organizations in our dataset cover a wide spectrum. They include formally registered organizations and non-registered grassroots initiatives; organizations with diverse ideological positions including liberalism and nationalism; organizations involved in 'traditional' NGO activities such as awareness-raising and advocacy, but also organizations employing coercive methods. Some of the organizations in our dataset work only on corruption (and 47 of these have 'corruption' in the name of the organization). For other organizations, anti-corruption is just one of the areas of their activity. Organizations in this latter group may not explicitly state that they are engaged in anti-corruption activity, in some cases because of the risks associated with anti-corruption activism in Ukraine. 188 of the organizations we have interviewed address corruption in general or several types of corruption at once, while 53 organizations focus on corruption related to one particular public service or corruption in one particular policy area.

In line with the third assumption of the Dialogue & Dissent program indicated above, we have assumed that there is a causal relationship between the work of the anti-corruption CSOs and creating a real impact. The dependent variable in this context is the impact of anti-corruption CSOs. In our analysis of the different types of impact that anti-corruption CSOs in Ukraine create, we have distinguished between counteracting

corruption as it occurs (ex post anti-corruption) and preventing corruption from occurring in the first place (ex ante anti-corruption). The impact created by individual anti-corruption CSOs has been verified through a triangulation of sources, including self-assessment of CSOs, assessment by other activists and by donors, and monitoring of (social) media. The independent variables in our research have been selected through a two-step process. Our starting point has been the theory of change of the Dialogue & Dissent program, which distinguishes between political roles, advocacy strategies, and organizational forms and lists concrete variables under each of these categories. In a next step, we have conducted a literature review to identify factors that are specifically associated with success of anti-corruption activism around the world. These factors include environmental factors (especially political will), advocacy strategies, and organizational characteristics. As noted, these variables are closely aligned with the variables highlighted by the theory of change of the Dialogue & Dissent program and include crucial political roles. The variables that we expected to be important based on the theory of change of the Dialogue & Dissent program and our own literature review have generally proven to be highly relevant to the context of anti-corruption CSOs in the regions of Ukraine. These include, inter alia, tactics of claim (confrontational or non-confrontational), human resources, foreign funding, and political will.

Annex 1: updated schematic of analytic framework
Civil Society against Corruption in Ukraine: Political Roles, Advocacy Strategies, and Impact

		supply factors			contextual factors
	Ultimate goal: change in power relations, poverty reduction, inclusive outcomes				
dependent variable	⬆ **Impact of anti-corruption activism** (changes in policies/ approaches to anti-corruption at local/regional level, active engagement by local/regional officials, *inter alia*) ⬆				
			supply factors		contextual factors
		political roles	advocacy strategies	organizational forms	
independent variables	Anti-corruption activism Unit of analysis: CSOs (formal and informal)	educational, communicative, representational, cooperative	type of claim	which of five capabilities does the organization have?	political will of local/regional authorities
		political affiliation	advocacy claim	legal status	
			basis of claim	resources (staff, office)	
			voicer of the claim	organizational tructure	
			target of the claim	source of funding	
			tactics of claim I: confrontational or non-confrontational?	cooperation with other CSOs	
			tactics of claim II: insider or outsider?	grassroots vs donor-funded	
			tactics of claim III: In which of the following does the organization engage? -information politics -symbolic politics -leverage politics -accountability politics		