


STRATEGIC ACTORS

**SOCIAL  
PROTECTION**

PRODUCTIVE  
EMPLOYMENT

# THE BUSINESS CASE FOR SOCIAL PROTECTION IN AFRICA

Synthesis report series



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**INCLUDE**

KNOWLEDGE PLATFORM ON INCLUSIVE DEVELOPMENT POLICIES

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## Acronyms

AIC	agricultural input coupon
APD	African Policy Dialogue
CCT	conditional cash transfer
FARM	financial agricultural risk management
GDP	gross domestic product
INCLUDE	Knowledge Platform on Inclusive Development Policies
MoGLSD	Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (Uganda)
NIM	nominal income multiplier
NWO-WOTRO	Netherlands Scientific Organization – Science for Global Development
PPP	purchasing power parity
RIM	real income multiplier
RIDSSA	Research for Inclusive Development in Sub-Saharan Africa
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
UCT	unconditional cash transfer
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNU-MERIT	United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology
WII	weather index insurance

## List of programmes assessed

BISP	Benazir Income Support Programme (Pakistan)
CGP	Child Grants Programme (Lesotho/Zambia)
CT-OVC	Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (Kenya)
CSG	Child Support Grant (Uganda)
FISP	Farm Input Subsidy Programme (Malawi)
FMS-FPC	Free Maternal Services/Free Primary Care (Kenya)
Give Directly	Give Directly (Kenya)
GUP	Graduation from Ultra Poverty (Ghana)
HABP	Household Asset Building Programme (Ethiopia)
HSCT	Harmonized Social Cash Transfer (Zimbabwe)
LEAP	Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (Ghana)
LIPW	Labour Intensive Public Works (Ghana)
MCTG	Multiple Category Targeting Grant (Zambia)
MSAF	Malawi Social Action Fund (Malawi)
NHIS	National Health Insurance Scheme (Ghana)
OBA	Reproductive Health Output-Based Aid (Kenya)
OFSP	Other Food Security Programme (Ethiopia)
NSNP	Niger Safety Net Project (Niger)
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Programme (Ethiopia)
Progresa	Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación (Mexico)
SCG	Senior Citizens Grant (Uganda)
SCTP	Social Cash Transfer Programme (Malawi)
SCTPP	Social Cash Transfer Pilot Programme (Ethiopia)
SHLCPTS	Self-Help Low-Cost Post-Traumatic Stress Programme (Uganda)
TCHP	Community Health Plan (Kenya)
VFSG	Vulnerable Family Support Grant (Uganda)
YESP	Youth Employment Support Project (Sierra Leone)
YOP	Youth Opportunities Programme (Uganda)

## Executive summary

While many African countries have registered high growth in the last decade, a large number of Africans remain excluded from the benefits of this progress. Research shows that social protection can contribute to making growth more inclusive. Although the importance of social protection is increasingly being recognized by African governments, many national governments are still reluctant to invest in social protection systems.

Evidence-based knowledge about the effects of social protection interventions on inclusive development can help generate political and financial commitment for the provision of such programmes. Accordingly, this review provides a synthesis of the available knowledge on social protection. It builds on the Research for Inclusive Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (RIDSSA) knowledge agenda, which aims to widen the evidence base on the economic returns of investing in social protection. It synthesises the current literature, including publications by the seven research consortia under INCLUDE's [RIDSSA](#) programme, and draws on insights gained through INCLUDE's [African Policy Dialogues](#).

It aims to provide an overview of the contribution of social protection to the intermediate objectives of inclusive growth, such as the accumulation of human capital, the stimulation of investment in, and protection and accumulation of, productive assets, the promotion of labour market participation, and the generation of local multipliers and spillover effects. To determine the contribution of social protection, the review looks at the following three areas:

- **Medium and long-term impacts of social protection on inclusive growth.** The returns of social protection programmes, as measured by intermediate indicators of growth (such as food security, health and education), are substantial, however, it is also important to determine how these returns develop over the medium and long term. Accordingly, this review looks at the medium and long-term impacts of social protection programmes.
- **Cost effectiveness.** This review also looks at the cost effectiveness of social protection programmes and asks if the costs are justified by their long-term impact on inclusive development.
- **Coordination and implementation.** The effective implementation of social protection requires political will at all levels of governance, alignment with informal institutions and strong institutions in general. This review looks at the conditions required for the effective coordination and implementation of social protection interventions.

**Social protection and inclusive growth: medium and long-term impact**

**At the household level**, many impact evaluations show the contributions that social protection can have on intermediate indicators of inclusive growth. The majority of evaluations shows positive outcomes for food security, consumption, education, health, psychological wellbeing, asset accumulation, savings, labour and income. However, in the long term these impacts may be different: effects increase or dissipate, and other households can catch up or lag behind. While some evaluations show positive impacts in the long term, several evaluations show that non-beneficiary households eventually catch up with beneficiary households. Higher, more regular and predictable transfers over a longer duration are likely to improve long-term outcomes. More research is required to provide robust explanations for differences in long-term impact.

**At the community level**, most evaluations show the positive effects of transfers on the local economy. A transfer of USD 1 results in an average increase in income of USD 0.08–0.81 in the local economy, when accounting for inflation. However, inflation rates cannot be attributed to social protection interventions, and are more likely to be caused by high national levels of inflation.

Social protection can also strengthen social ties within communities. Various evaluations have found increases in (informal) village savings schemes, sharing arrangements, and informal in-kind support, as well as new or strengthened social networks. However, negative social effects have also been found, such as the erosion of networks and trust in formal institutions when targeted transfers are perceived as unfair.

Explanations for differences in impact can be found in factors **external** or **internal** to interventions. External, exogenous factors of success can include (higher) pre-transfer levels of social and human capital, access to services, levels of market integration, sources of livelihood and employment opportunities. At the macro level, the quality and availability of social policies, such as free education, infrastructure development and good governance, are important. Regarding factors internal to (the design) of the programme, the only clear outcome is that higher transfers lead to better outcomes. The effect of factors, such as the payment modality and duration of the programme, is dependent on the context of implementation. This confirms the fact that there is no ‘silver bullet’ that will bring about the same positive changes in all settings. Programmes that are able to resonate with the specific needs, risks and vulnerabilities of the target population are most likely to be successful.

Evaluations that show positive impacts on intermediate factors of inclusive growth do not necessarily show positive outcomes for **vulnerable groups**, including the extreme poor, children, women, the elderly and people living in remote areas. In fact, inadequate targeting can result in increased levels of inequality.

Reaching the **extreme poor** is challenging. Several evaluations with positive results on average show little or no improvement for the extreme poor. High transaction costs (i.e. registration in the programme, physical distance from the implementing institution, etc.), lack of quality information and the inability of programmes to address the specific socio-cultural and psychosocial constraints of the extreme poor are some of the reasons why social protection programmes have failed to reach the extreme poor.

In the debate on **universal** or **targeted programmes**, there is some evidence emerging that universal programmes reach the poor better than targeted programmes. The outcomes of cost-benefit analyses of both types of programmes depend on various factors. These include the range of benefits evaluated (i.e. how many indicators are assessed), the extent to which hidden costs (such as additional costs incurred by households, but also leakage to the non-poor and imperfect coverage of poor households) and hidden benefits (indirect benefits and spillover effects to other populations) are assessed, the timeframe used for the evaluation, the transfer size, and the extent to which additional weight is given to redistribution to (extremely) poor households.

Research shows that both universal programmes and programmes targeted at **children** (such as school feeding programmes), **women** (such as public works programmes) and the **elderly** (social pensions) have large positive outcomes, particularly in the long term. Programmes improving access to quality education and reducing child labour can have large, long-lasting impacts for children. Investments in infrastructure such as quality roads and mobile phone networks are needed to improve access to social protection for **people in remote areas**.

### **Cost effectiveness**

The number of studies measuring the **cost effectiveness** of social protection programmes is limited, but most point to the benefits outweighing the costs. Generally, cost-benefit ratios are negative in the start-up phase of the programme (usually in the first 15 months), and become (more) positive over time. Projections of future costs and benefits find ratios improving with the duration of the programme, as well as when indirect benefits, such as the future benefits of education, are included. When comparing the cost effectiveness of various programmes, it appears that programmes integrating various social protection instruments (e.g. cash transfers and asset trainings) or social protection with other social policies (e.g. combining free maternal health care with improving the quality of health clinics) have higher value for money than single interventions. It also appears that cash transfers have high cost-benefit ratios, compared to e.g. food vouchers or asset transfers. However, the most cost-effective modality depends on contextual factors and the timeframe of the evaluation. For instance, in-kind food transfers are more appropriate when

markets are not functioning, while cash transfers are usually preferred if markets are functioning. Evaluations of graduation programmes that integrate interventions sequentially throughout the programme show positive results.

In general, improving the wellbeing of extremely poor households is more costly than social intervention programmes that target other populations. This is because it is difficult to target the extreme poor, and alleviating their constraints requires multifaceted programmes. Hence, programmes aimed at the extreme poor may be perceived as less cost effective. This implies a trilemma: the objectives of cost effectiveness, universality and the targeting vulnerable groups appear to be difficult to combine. A different picture of benefits may arise if redistribution and the reduction of inequality are given additional value.

Only a few studies have empirically tested **interaction effects** between social protection interventions, and with mixed results. Positive interaction effects would justify investment in joint, instead of separate, programmes. In general, studies of interaction effects between social protection and other social policies (such as providing financial training or counselling to traumatized women) show positive results. Behaviour change communication particularly appears to contribute to large effects of cash transfers. In addition, effective coordination and implementation can improve synergies between programmes.

### **Coordination and implementation**

The cost effectiveness of social protection programmes is often hindered by imperfect **coordination and implementation**. Seven main factors affecting coordination and implementation have been identified. First, African countries need to fill gaps in the financing of social protection programmes. Second, the delivery of transfers and information can be smoothed by improved payment modalities and stronger implementing institutions. Third, vertical governance can be improved through legal measures to establish clear roles and responsibilities between levels of government, improved structures for monitoring and evaluation, and improved cooperation with informal institutions such as traditional authorities. Fourth, community participation needs to be improved in order to adapt programmes to local contexts (such as seasonal circumstances or local agricultural schemes) and the priorities of different populations. Sixth, adequate legislative frameworks and institutions can make the implementation of programmes more efficient. If not, actors often operate in isolation and may duplicate actions or interventions at various levels. Finally, the promotion of evidence-based policy making can contribute to more cost-effective social protection, as it creates more awareness about the potential benefits of social protection, can improve the implementation and coordination of existing and new policies, and can prevent elite capture.

The political space for such improvements depends on whether a **strategic context** exists or can be created. In this regard, ownership by national governments is essential for long-term commitment to social protection. In a broad sense, ownership allows for a social contract between the state and its citizens and the redistribution of public domestic resources. The political will for such a context can be cultivated by creating a demand for social protection from the grassroots, particularly among the upcoming middle class in Sub-Saharan Africa. Windows of opportunity, such as political elections or economic crises, can create momentum and exert political pressure for social protection.

### **Conclusion**

The RIDSSA research projects have contributed to the compelling evidence base on the contribution of social protection to inclusive growth. However, the extent to which social protection is able to do so depends on various factors internal to the design and implementation of the programme (such as size and duration of the programme) and external factors (such as the socio-economic context of the intervention). This review provides insights into the question under which conditions the contribution of social protection to inclusive growth can be optimized.

## 1. Introduction

While most African countries have registered high growth in the last decade, a large number of people remain excluded from the benefits of this progress. The Knowledge Platform on Inclusive Development Policies (INCLUDE) envisages that more inclusive development requires policies for economic transformation, productive employment and social protection to ensure that vulnerable and poor groups, especially young people and women, benefit from growth. However, such inclusive policies can only be realized if they are supported by coalitions of strategic actors across state and society that can overcome resistance to change among the ruling political and commercial elite. This vision is the core of INCLUDE's knowledge agenda, as laid down in the Netherlands Scientific Organization – Science for Global Development (NWO-WOTRO) programme '[Research for Inclusive Development in Sub-Saharan Africa](#)' (RIDSSA), commissioned by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This programme consists of three themes: productive employment, social protection and strategic actors for inclusive development. One of the objectives of the platform is to synthesize existing and new knowledge on inclusive development to 'make knowledge work' for policymakers and practitioners.

This synthesis report provides an overview of policy-relevant knowledge on social protection. Social protection can contribute to achieving inclusive economic growth and development in Sub-Saharan Africa in many ways, but national governments are sometimes reluctant to invest in comprehensive social protection systems (Cherrier et al., 2013). Evidence-based knowledge about the anticipated effects of these interventions for inclusive development is necessary to generate political and financial commitment to the provision of social protection. Social protection is not only a powerful tool to alleviate monetary poverty, but is widely recognized as an important policy instrument to address economic, social and political exclusion and vulnerability (c.f. World Bank, 2018; IOB, 2018). It is linked to inclusive development through various transmission channels, such as the reduction of inequality, promotion of labour market participation, accumulation and protection of productive assets, investment in human capital, and strengthening of citizenship rights and governance (Barrientos, 2012; Alderman & Yemtsov, 2012, 2013).

In the early 2010s, several authors developed frameworks that conceptually link social protection to economic growth (for example, Alderman & Yemtsov, 2012; Barrientos, 2012; Cherrier et al., 2013). At that time, most research analysed particular aspects of these frameworks, focusing primarily on the short term. This generated a solid evidence base confirming the role of social protection in the protection and

accumulation of human and physical capital, easing of credit constraints, and stabilization of aggregate demand (for an overview see Mathers & Slater, 2014; Arnold et al., 2011; International Labour Organization, 2010b).


### 1.1 The rise of social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa

Despite many myths and prejudices about social protection schemes as protective, rather than promotive, instruments, social protection programmes are increasingly recognized as pro-poor interventions at the international level. As part of the ‘leaving no one behind’ agenda of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), target 1.3 under SDG 1 on poverty eradication explicitly calls for “the implementation of nationally-appropriate social protection systems and measures for all, including social protection floors” (United Nations, n.d.: target 1.3). Social protection is further mentioned in SDG 3 (health and wellbeing), 5 (gender equality), 8 (decent work) and 10 (reducing inequality). Within the African context, social protection is an increasingly important issue. In 2010, 47 African states signed the Yaoundé Tripartite Declaration on the effective and rapid implementation of a social protection floor for all Africans (International Labour Organization, 2010a). Social protection as a human right is further acknowledged in documents such as the African Union’s Agenda 2063 (African Union, 2015a) and its Addis Ababa Declaration on social protection for inclusive development (African Union, 2015b).

Assessments of the size and cost of social protection programmes differ because of the type of programmes they include. For instance, the World Bank’s annual report, *The State of Social Safety Nets*, looks only at some non-contributory social protection programmes, such as conditional/unconditional cash transfers, food and in-kind transfers, social pensions, public works and fee waivers (World Bank, 2018). The report does not cover forms of contributory social protection such as health insurance, maternity benefits, contributory pensions or other types of insurance. Neither does it cover labour market programmes such as wage subsidies, unemployment insurance or early retirement incentives. In turn, social protection programmes only form a subset of social policies.

As shown in Figure 1, Sub-Saharan Africa has the second highest net spending on social safety nets of any region, behind Europe and Central Asia. On average, Sub-Saharan African countries spend 1.5% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on social safety nets, ranging from 0.0% in São Tomé and Príncipe to 10.1% in South Sudan (World Bank, 2018). Most countries in this region have seen this share rise since the turn of the century (Monchuk, 2013). However, in terms of absolute spending and when accounting for the large differences in GDP, a different picture emerges. The Seychelles, Mauritius, South Africa, Namibia and Lesotho together have higher annual spending on social safety nets than all other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa combined. Expenditure on social safety nets is increasingly coming from national governments, although international donors still make a major contribution (see Figure 2). In Sub-Saharan Africa, approximately 18% is spent on social pensions, 18% on conditional cash transfers (CCTs), 15% on unconditional cash transfers (UCTs), 13% on fee waivers (excluding health fee waivers) and slightly smaller amounts on in-kind transfers, public works, school feeding and other social safety nets (World Bank, 2018).

**Figure 1. Average global and regional spending on social safety nets (as % of GDP)\***




Source: World Bank, 2018

\* Not all countries in each region have been included

The quality of governance, rather than the size of the economy, appears to be one of the major drivers behind increased spending on social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the

**Figure 2. Funding of social safety nets in Sub-Saharan Africa**




United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, GDP growth rates are not related to increased social protection spending, while democratically governed countries are more likely to invest a larger share of GDP in social protection (Bhorat et al., 2017). Moreover, countries that have a less high dependency on natural resources generally have higher spending on social protection.

The rise of social safety nets in Sub-Saharan Africa can make a substantial contribution to poverty eradication and inequality reduction. As shown in Figure 3, those in the poorest income quintiles make up the largest share of beneficiaries of social protection. For instance, 60% of the beneficiaries of CCTS are in the two lowest income quintiles. This trend is visible for all types of safety nets.

Yet, despite the rise of pro-poor social protection programmes, many Africans are excluded from social protection. According to the World Bank, 81.4% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population are not covered by formal social protection programmes (World Bank, 2018). Therefore, a large share of the population still lacks access to social protection. To overcome this lack of coverage,

**Figure 3. Global distribution of beneficiaries of social safety nets, by pre-transfer income quintile**



Source: World Bank, 2018

and to use the potential of social protection for poverty eradication and inclusive development, the expansion of national social protection programmes is essential. Yet, national governments are often faced with limited resources and a lack of political will to invest in government-funded programmes and (progressive) taxation systems to fund them (see, for instance, Pouw and Gupta, 2015). This lack of political will is often driven by the belief that social protection is a mere ‘handout’ without contributing to growth and, thus, is not considered to be financially sustainable. Social protection is often defined differently, according to programme objectives. For instance, the World Bank defines social protection as assistance to reduce vulnerability through better risk management, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) defines it as transfers and services that help individuals and households confront risk and adversity and ensure a minimum standard of dignity and wellbeing throughout their lifecycle (Holmes & Lwanga-Ntale, 2012) and

the government of Uganda defines it as “public and private interventions that address vulnerabilities associated with being or becoming poor” (MoGLSD, 2016a: 1). None of these definitions acknowledges the promotive and transformative potential that social protection can have as well.

Therefore, research into the contribution of social protection to inclusive growth in Sub-Saharan Africa can contribute by:

- Identifying how, under which conditions and to what extent social protection programmes can contribute to inclusive growth, in order to have an overview of the range of contributions that social protection can make towards inclusive growth, and sustainable poverty and inequality reduction.
- Assessing to what extent, and under which conditions, the benefits of these programmes outweigh the costs in the long-term. This cost-benefit analysis can contribute to painting an evidence-based picture of the financial sustainability of social protection programmes within the context of scarce resources.
- Identifying what political economy conditions can lead to increased political will for social protection policies, and the improved coordination and implementation of existing programmes, to improve their (cost) effectiveness.

## 1.2 Scope of review

This review builds on the INCLUDE knowledge agenda, which aims to widen the evidence base on the economic returns of investing in social protection. While also acknowledging and underlining the protective and preventive objective of social protection (c.f. Adesina, 2012; Mkandawire, 2004), the research under this agenda focuses on the promotive and transformative potential of social protection: i.e. how it can (directly and indirectly) contribute to inclusive growth in Sub-Saharan Africa.

This review attempts to provide an overview of the contribution of social protection to the intermediate objectives related to inclusive growth, such as the accumulation of human capital, the stimulation of investment in, protection and accumulation of productive assets, the promotion of labour market participation, and the generation of local multipliers and spillover effects. Apart from this objective, the review looks at three distinct areas, in line with the RIDSSA research call, taking into account the research tasks outlined in the previous section:

- ☐ **The medium and long-term impacts of social protection on inclusive growth.** As outlined in INCLUDE’s concept note on social protection (Gassmann, 2014), it is important to “not only

consider the direct and short-run effects, but also analyze indirect and long-term effects” in order to paint a complete picture of the contribution of social protection to inclusive growth. The returns of social protection programmes for intermediate indicators of growth (such as food security, health and education) are substantial. Yet, these returns take time to materialize, which is often beyond the scope of direct impact evaluations. This review, therefore, focuses on both short-term evaluations and medium and long-term projections.

- ② **The cost effectiveness of social protection:** Governments are often reluctant to invest in national social protection programmes, because they require a reallocation of (scarce) resources. To contribute to the evidence base to make a compelling argument for policymakers, the research projects under the RIDSSA call related the effectiveness of programmes to their respective costs. The basic question addressed here is: ‘Are the costs of social protection interventions justified by the long-term impact on inclusive development?’.
- ② **The coordination and implementation of social protection:** Although social protection programmes are on the rise in Sub-Saharan Africa (see section 2), their effectiveness is often hindered by unsuccessful implementation and coordination. Effective implementation requires political will at all levels of governance, alignment with informal institutions and strong institutions in general. In investigating the institutional requirements for effective implementation and coordination, this review focuses on the question: ‘What are the key factors in a strategic context for social protection?’.

### 1.3 Methodology

This synthesis is built on a literature review, publications from the RIDSSA research consortia and evidence from two African Policy Dialogues (APDs):<sup>1</sup>

- **Literature review:** A literature review on the business case for social protection, conducted by Franziska Gassmann and Eszter Timár from the United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and Social Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (UNU-MERIT). The literature for this review

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<sup>1</sup> The INCLUDE platform is grateful to all contributors to the resources outlined above, including the researchers and other members of the seven research consortia, the authors of the literature review, the participants in the African Policy Dialogues, and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and NWO-WOTRO for their funding and support. INCLUDE is also grateful to authors of earlier synthesis reports on social protection, such as World Bank (2018), Handa et al. (2017), Guloba et al. (2017) and Gassmann (2014) for their contributions to the evidence base on social protection for inclusive development.

was collected using different strategies: snowballing from identified key publications, a bibliographic database search and a hand search of relevant academic journals. While preference was given to academic literature, grey literature (such as published reports from international development partners and implementing agencies) was also included. Although the review has covered various types of programmes in different countries, this review should not be read as a systematic review.

- **Publications of seven RIDSSA research consortia:** These consortia, under the RIDSSA call for ‘The cost effectiveness of social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa’, compared the cost effectiveness of existing social protection programmes in Uganda, Kenya, Ghana and Ethiopia. The findings of these consortia used in this review stem from the different academic and policy outputs of the research groups, including policy briefs, working papers, (interim) findings, presentations, interviews and input provided during the INCLUDE writers’ workshop on 29 March 2018. An overview of the projects and programmes studied is provided in Table 1. Several quantitative results of these projects can be found in tables in Annex 1. Throughout this review, the publications of the RIDSSA research groups are indicated by the INCLUDE logo  (for example,  Pouw et al., 2017).

**Table 1. Seven research projects on social protection**

Project title	Country	Theme	Intervention(s) studied
<a href="#">Social Protection in Uganda</a>	Uganda	Inclusive growth (local economy effects, household productivity, human capital, etc.)	Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Senior Citizens Grant (SCG)</li> <li>- Vulnerable Family Support Grant (VFSG)</li> </ul>
<a href="#">Social Protection in the Afar Region</a>	Ethiopia	Social security, poverty reduction and the inclusion of pastoral communities	Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) Alternative social protection interventions for pastoral communities
<a href="#">Post Trauma Services for Women’s Empowerment</a>	Uganda	Women’s economic empowerment in post-trauma areas	Cash transfers Counselling/post-trauma support
<a href="#">Weather Insurance for Ethiopian Farmers</a>	Ethiopia	Agricultural productivity	PSNP PSNP + weather index insurance (WII) PSNP + agricultural input coupons (AICs)
<a href="#">Social and Health Policies for Inclusive Growth</a>	Ghana + Kenya	Inclusive growth (food security, health, asset accumulation, labour	Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP, Ghana)

		and wellbeing)	National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS, Ghana)  Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC, Kenya)
<a href="#">Maternity Fee Waiver in Kenya</a>	Kenya	Access to maternal health care through free care and health insurance	Free Maternity Services and Free Primary Care (FMS-FPC)  Community Health Plan (TCHP)
<a href="#">Social Protection through Maternal Health Programmes</a>	Kenya	Access to maternal health care through free care and health care vouchers	Free Maternity Services and Free Primary Care (FMS-FPC)  Reproductive Health Output-Based Aid (OBA) voucher programme

- **African Policy Dialogues:** In addition, this synthesis includes evidence from the APDs. APDs are funded by INCLUDE, initiated by platform members and driven by local policy actors, researchers, practitioners and other stakeholders. The stakeholders collaboratively identify research evidence gaps in current policies and new research needs, gather the evidence, synthesize it, and share it with stakeholders for use in policy making and implementation.

The information on APDs in this paper derives from the documentation generated by the two African APDs, namely:

- [Women’s entrepreneurship and social protection in Uganda](#)
- [Utafiti Sera on social protection in Kenya](#)

The APD in Uganda was initiated in February 2016 to establish an effective national policy-knowledge community to increase awareness of the need to pay special attention to women’s entrepreneurship and social protection and to promote interventions that take into account gender, geography and the lifecycle of the target groups. Utafiti Sera on social protection in Kenya was established in 2015 to bridge the research evidence policy gap, because researchers find it difficult to get their research to policymakers, while policymakers claim that they lack relevant research evidence, and because the extent to which research has informed existing social protection policies and interventions in Kenya was not known. More information on the African Policy Dialogues can be found in Annex 2.

Box 1 outlines the sets of questions addressed under each of these three main themes around which the review is structured.

**Box 1. Guiding questions for synthesis social protection**

**1. Social protection and inclusive growth (chapter 2)**

- How do social protection interventions affect the accumulation of human capital, investment in social protection and the accumulation of productive assets, and labour participation at the household level?
- How do social protection interventions affect the development of assets, building of collective citizenship rights, generation of local multipliers and spillover effects, and reduction of inequality at the community level?
- Do social protection interventions have different effects on different population groups? Which interventions have the highest potential in terms of reaching vulnerable groups?

**2. The cost effectiveness of social protection interventions (chapter 3)**

- What type of social protection programmes or policies are most cost-effective?
- Under what conditions are social protection interventions either complementary to, or a substitute for, alternative policies aimed at the same objective of inclusive growth?

**3. The coordination and implementation of social protection (chapter 4)**

- To what extent can the improved coordination and implementation of social protection programmes make them more cost effective?
- How do formal and informal social protection systems interact? Does formal social protection reduce the scale and inclusivity of informal social protection networks or does it support such informal social protection systems?
- What are the institutional conditions needed to make social protection policy political feasible and create willingness on the part of the government to invest in social protection? Who are the strategic actors that can achieve this?

**1.4 Structure of this report**

The structure of this synthesis report is as follows. In chapter 2, we look at social protection and inclusive growth in Africa at the household and community level. We also look at the external and internal factors affecting the success of social protection programmes and the potential of such programmes for vulnerable groups. In chapter 3 we look at the cost effectiveness of social protection programmes, how universal programmes compare to targeted programmes, and complementary and substitution effects. We also look at the long-term cost effectiveness of social protection for vulnerable groups. In chapter 4, we look at the coordination and implementation of social protection interventions and the necessary policy conditions for social protection to work. In chapter 5, we summarize the main findings of the report.

## 2. Social protection and inclusive growth: medium and long-term impacts

The potential of social protection policies goes beyond the mere redistribution of income and the provision of safety nets. Social protection policies can also contribute to inclusive economic growth. Following the framework developed by Szirmai (2012), social protection programmes affect the proximate, intermediate and ultimate determinants of economic growth. In search of a better understanding of the ways that social protection can contribute to inclusive development, the attention of economic and social research has expanded towards the medium and long-term impacts and the cost effectiveness of policy options. Generally, such studies can be grouped into two categories: those investigating effects at the micro level (household or individual) and those looking at the meso level (local community). The former research quantifies the outcomes at the household level (human capital accumulation, productive asset creation or protection, and labour participation), while the latter looks at the local economy spillover effects of social transfers, typically aiming to measure any multiplier effects generated by the increased purchasing and investing power of recipients.

This chapter outlines the evidence available on the contribution of social protection to economic growth at the household level (section 2.1) and community level (section 2.2). An overview of the outcomes at the household level can also be found in Table 3 in section 2.1. Section 2.3 then outlines which conditions influence the extent to which social protection achieves these aims. Finally, section 2.4 looks at the types of populations that benefit from social protection programmes and how social protection can support vulnerable groups.

### 2.1 At the household level

A large pool of impact evaluations have provided compelling evidence on the short-term and direct effects of social protection programmes on nutrition, health, housing, education and access to basic services for households and individuals. There is also evidence that social protection affects the economic empowerment of women, intimate partner relations and other socio-cultural dimensions (for recent overviews, see De la O Campos, 2015; Bastagli et al., 2016; Davis et al., 2016; IPC-IG, 2017b). In this section, the effect of social protection interventions is measured through nine main dimensions<sup>2</sup> of human capital accumulation, productive asset creation or protection, and labour participation.

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<sup>2</sup> These dimensions are selected by the authors as the main dimensions identified and researched under the RIDSSA research agenda and do not constitute a comprehensive list.

However, the long-term impact of social protection requires a more complex conceptualization than these nine dimensions as separate intermediary factors of inclusive growth. The indirect effects of social protection interventions can be substantial and often materialize over a longer timeframe than the period of intervention. The indirect effects of interventions through increased human capital can take up to 30 years before fully materialized, particularly in the case of impact on young children.

### **2.1.1 Food security**

Social protection programmes can contribute to food security directly (in the case of in-kind transfers) or through increased income or asset accumulation. Several impact evaluations have reported positive outcomes for several dimensions of food security. In general, Handa et al. (2017) found significant improvements in food security in six out of eight interventions studied. Increased food consumption and access to food was found by a range of evaluations. An evaluation of Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE), performed by Uganda's Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MoGLSD) found a decrease in the ratio of households with fewer than two meals per day by more than 11% (MoGLSD, 2016b). For every 1% decrease in the number of households eating fewer than two meals a day in non-SAGE districts, the assessment found a 2.13% decrease in SAGE districts. However, the same evaluation found no significant impact on stunting.

Asfaw et al. (2016) found that the Social Cash Transfer Pilot Programme (SCTPP) in Ethiopia has decreased the likelihood of households suffering food shortages in dry seasons, increased the amount of meals consumed per day and decreased the number of months per year in which there are problems satisfying food needs. An indicator of food security can also be found in the decrease in begging and changes in eating habits in Ethiopia, Lesotho and Malawi (Barca et al., 2015). In evaluating the impact of different transfer sizes under the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) in Ethiopia, Berhane et al. (2014) found that participating households who received transfers for 5 years experienced a reduction in the hungry season of 1.29 months more than eligible households with very small transfers. Receiving both the PSNP and Household Asset Building Programme (HABP) led to a 1.5 month reduction in the hungry season. In an earlier evaluation, Berhane et al. (2011) concluded that the PSNP and Other Food Security Programme (OFSP)/HABP increased food security by 1.53 months per year. Conditional on receiving PSNP, the OFSP/HABP increased food security by 0.61 months. Conditional on receiving OFSP/HABP, the PSNP increased food security by 1.38 months (Berhane et al., 2011).

Public works programmes also have proven to be effective in improving food security. For instance, households participating in a public works programme in Sierra Leone reported 8% more expenditure on food than non-participating households (Rosas & Sabarwal, 2016). A food assistance programme providing a monthly household food basket for people living with HIV in Uganda showed a significant increase in food security at the household level (Rawat et al., 2014). Based on a systematic review of 27 safety net programmes in 14 African countries, Ralston et al. (2017) concluded that per USD transferred to beneficiary households USD 0.74 goes to household consumption (see section 2.1.2), of which 0.36 is used on food expenses.

Yet, several evaluations found mixed or insignificant results for food security. In the case of Ghana, Pouw et al. (2017) found that the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme improved the per capita consumption of beneficiaries, but without a significant impact on the extreme poor (see Table A1 in Annex 1). On the other hand, the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) appears to have led to a significant improvement in food consumption for the poor and extreme poor, but not for the full population studied. In the case of the Child Grants Programme (CGP) in Zambia, studied by Handa et al. (2017; 2018) and Seidenfeld et al. (2014), an improvement in food security (and consumption) was found at the household level. Yet, despite being one of the primary objectives of the programme, the CGP did not have a significant impact on the nutritional status of pre-school children.

The patterns of household expenditure after the introduction of programmes determines the impact of social protection on food security. In the case of 'GiveDirectly', studied by Haushofer and Shapiro (2016; 2018), transfers were found to have a significant impact on food security nine months after the introduction of the programme, yet this impact had evaporated at the three-year mark. Moreover, when taking spillover effects on other villages into account, there is a slight negative (and significant) impact on food security. Research needs to focus on the conditions through which social protection can impact positively on food security in the long term. Box 2 in section 2.10 also provides insight into the debate on the long-term impact of cash transfers.

### **2.1.2 Household consumption**

A major debate on the productive potential of cash transfers surrounds what households will use the transfer on: consumption, savings or investments in human capital? And if they use it for consumption, what type of consumption can contribute to poverty reduction and inclusive growth? Much of this debate will be

dealt with in subsequent paragraphs on education (section 2.1.3), health (section 2.1.4), asset accumulation (section 2.1.6) and savings (section 2.1.7). In relation to consumption patterns, Handa et al. (2017) have gathered information through their evaluation of eight unconditional cash transfer programmes. They conclude that the fear that transfers will be used to consume alcohol and tobacco is not justified: expenses on alcohol and tobacco constitute only 1–2% of total food expenditure and seven out of the eight evaluations showed no change in consumption. In fact, their evaluation in Lesotho showed that expenditure on alcohol actually declined after implementation of the programme. Similarly, Evans and Popova (2014) found that a conditional cash transfer programme in Tanzania led to an increase in consumption, but not in the consumption of alcohol and tobacco. Hence, the fear of investment in this type of consumption is not supported by evidence.

The types of consumption expenses are diverse and often based on specific household situations. In general, several reviews show an increase in consumption across regions. Bastagli et al. (2016) found that cash transfers improved household consumption in 25 of 35 evaluations. According to Davis et al. (2016), the doubling of crop production resulted in an increase in post-programme per capita consumption to a level 25% higher than the transfer itself. However, despite significant increases in food consumption, Pouw et al. (2017) found no significant impact of LEAP on overall household consumption. Explanatory factors identified by the authors are the irregularity of payments, the low amount of cash transferred and the fact that the payments were lump sum.

In terms of long-term impact, Haushofer and Shapiro's evaluation (2018) of cash transfers sheds some light on the topic. Similar to food security, the short-term impact on consumption appeared to be positive (and significant). Household monthly consumption increased from USD 158 purchasing power parity (PPP) to USD 193 (PPP). After three years, however, no significant impact was observed on the consumption of beneficiaries. In fact, a significant decline in consumption in other villages was observed as a result of negative spillover effects. The authors report: "Households impacted by spillovers have lower consumption and food security than pure control households, perhaps due to the sale of productive assets" (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2018, p. 1). Similarly, Blattman et al. (2018) found very small, insignificant impacts on consumption of the Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) in Uganda after nine years. The reasons behind this dissipating effect remain unclear, perhaps due to the lack of long-term evaluations.

### 2.1.3 Education

As indicated earlier, returns for education take time to materialize, and are often beyond the timeframe of impact evaluations. Short-term impacts can be identified through indicators such as school enrolment, attendance and a reduction in dropouts. While the direct income support programmes under SAGE in Uganda did not have an overall effect on education expenditure (Merttens et al., 2016), SAGE produced a 7% increase in school attendance for children aged 7–12 years and 14% for children in either primary or secondary school (MoGLSD, 2016b). For every 1% increase in school attendance in primary and secondary education in non-SAGE district, SAGE districts displayed a 2.79% increase. LEAP has increased school enrolment among secondary school aged children by 7 percentage points, and reduced grade repetition among both primary and secondary aged children. Among primary aged children LEAP has reduced absenteeism by 10 percentage points (Handa et al., 2013). Dropout rates have also improved. Beneficiary households were found to be less likely to take children out of school in almost all the countries analysed by Davis et al. (2016) and Daidone et al. (2016). Qualitative data studies showed that a CCT in Tanzania had very positive impacts on school attendance (Evans et al. 2014). The study also confirmed that girls in the programme were 23% more likely to complete primary school than those in the control group.

In the case of the YOP in Uganda, the unconditional transfer of USD 382 on average per participating group was partly invested in vocational training; 11% per group on the median. Between 2008 and 2010, 68% of the treatment group enrolled in vocational training, compared to 15% of the control group. This difference can largely be explained by the transfer: only 6 percent of the control group paid for vocational training themselves. The other 9 percent receive support from e.g. churches or charities. The large difference in enrolment led to an average of 340 more hours of vocational training for the treatment group compared to the control group (Blattman et al., 2014).

Despite positive outcomes for all other indicators, the public works programme in Sierra Leone did not improve access to education. In fact, school absenteeism increased among participating households (Rosas & Sabarwal, 2016). This absenteeism can probably be explained by school-aged children being required to do more tasks inside the households such as caring for siblings. However, there was no decrease in the enrolment of children.

In terms of the long-term impacts of social cash transfers on education, there is some emerging evidence from Mexico and Zambia. Two recent studies (Parker & Vogl, 2018; Kugler & Rojas, 2018) used quasi-

experimental designs to assess the long-term impact of Mexico's Prospera CCT (formerly known as Oportunidades and Progresa). Progresa was launched in 1996 by the Mexican government, and remains one of the largest nationally-owned conditional cash transfer programmes in the world (Kugler & Rojas, 2018). By comparing beneficiaries enrolled from early childhood to beneficiaries enrolled later in life, Parker and Vogl (2018) found that childhood exposure to the programme has had a large positive impact across all indicators for both men and women. Receiving the transfer at an age early enough to reap educational impacts meant an additional 1.33 additional grades of schooling and a 15-20% increase in educational attainment than those who enrolled at an older age. Kugler and Rojas (2018) also estimated the long-term impact of Prospera, finding that the average recipient of the programme completes almost three more years of education than non-recipients.

On the other hand, Haushofer and Shapiro (2018) found that GiveDirectly had no impact on educational outcomes, neither short nor long term. Similarly, Baird et al. (2016) discovered dissipating outcomes of a cash transfer pilot in Malawi. The experiment assigned UCTs and CCTs to school-aged girls for one or two years<sup>3</sup>. While one year after the last transfer payment positive impacts were found on educational attainment, HIV prevalence, teen pregnancy and early marriage, these effects dissipated by the endline survey conducted three years later. On the other hand, Dietrich et al. (2017b) found returns to education increasing over time. Through their simulation of returns on SAGE transfers in Uganda, they found that incomes increased over time as a result of education. They conclude that the Senior Citizens Grant (SCG) has higher return to investment than the Vulnerable Families Support Grant (VFSG), because of its higher pay outs, the long-term human capital effect of a transfer to children and various scale benefits of the SCG.

#### 2.1.4 Health

The impact of social protection interventions on health can occur directly (through free or reduced cost health care) or indirectly (through insurance, improved food security, hygiene and sanitation, or increased health expenditure as a result of additional income). Improved health can be measured using various indicators such as health expenses, facility visits, anthropometric measures of health and/or subjective health.

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<sup>3</sup> The duration of the project was then prolonged for a second year, but recipients did not foresee this extension and thus were expecting the programme to run for only one year.

In terms of medicine expenses, the combination of health insurance (NHIS) and cash transfers (LEAP) resulted in a significant increase in expenditures on medicines (Pouw et al., 2017). This may be an indicator of improved wellbeing, as additional income can be devoted to medicine expenditure. On the other hand, the availability of free care can also reduce expenses. After the introduction of the national Free Maternity Services and Free Primary Care (FMS-FPC) in Kenya, Elbers et al. (2018) found a decrease in average health care expenditure in Nandi County. This indicates improved financial protection among the population, who also have access to the contributory Community Health Plan. This introduction of free care also appears to have reduced the prevalence of incidental, out-of-pocket payments, which can have a detrimental impact on a household's financial stability. Elbers et al. (2018) report a decrease in the number of households making out-of-pocket payments from 4% of the population in 2003 to approximately 1% in 2013.

In terms of visits to health facilities, Elbers et al. (2018) also found an increase in the average number of postnatal visits to health services from 3.0 visits per child per year to 7.3 visits in 2013. In general, the use of antenatal care and skilled delivery care has increased substantially after introduction of the FMS-FPC (Elbers et al., 2018; Merten, 2018). The proportion of women who had 4+ antenatal care visits, increased to 68% in urban areas and 51% in rural areas in 2014. The proportion of women who had skilled deliveries increased to 83% in urban areas and 51% in rural areas. Both figures are high compared to average percentages in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, the increase in facility deliveries was already noticeable prior to the FMS-FPC and, thus, may not be (fully) attributable to these interventions (Elbers et al., 2018; Merten, 2018). In Sierra Leone, treatment households reported an average of 12% more visits to health facilities than the control group (Rosas & Sabarwal, 2016). The proportion of boys aged 0–5 who were taken to a health facility when sick was 9% higher in treatment households. If we consider all boys ages 0–5 irrespective of their health status at the time they were taken to the doctor, the increase is 23% (Rosas & Sabarwal, 2016).

Finally, actual improved health most directly describes the effectiveness of social protection programmes in terms its impact on health. Yet, few studies directly measure this. In relation to this, Ghana's NHIS was found to significantly improve weight-for-age, height-for-age and weight-for-height for children (Pouw et al., 2017; see Table A1 in Annex 1). The SAGE programme also contributed to an increase in weight-for-height for children under five in the short term (MoGLSD, 2016b). Food assistance programmes to people living with HIV in Uganda have resulted in a significant increase in body mass index and mid-upper arm

circumference (Rawat et al., 2014). A CCT in Tanzania resulted in a 5% decrease in the likelihood of being sick for participating households, and a 11% decrease for children age 0–4 (Evans et al., 2014). A major contribution to improved health can be the high increase in the number of people having health insurance and, consequently, the reduction in out-of-pocket expenditure.

However, the long-term impacts on health remain unclear. Haushofer and Shapiro (2018) and Baird et al. (2016) found no significant improvement in health indicators. In the evaluation by Baird et al. (2016), the cash transfer pilot in Malawi showed reduced HIV prevalence and teen pregnancy among school-aged girls in the short-term, but these effects had dissipated three years later.

### 2.1.5 Psychological wellbeing

Much less research has been performed on the effect of social protection on psychological wellbeing. Haushofer and Shapiro initially found improvements in the psychological wellbeing of beneficiaries (2016), but saw these dissipating over time (2018). A study by Uganda’s Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MoGLSD, 2016b) found that SAGE led to an improvement in the beneficiaries’ self-esteem and psychosocial wellbeing.

An explicit investigation into the impact of social protection on psychological wellbeing has been performed by Van Reisen et al. (© 2018) in their investigation of cash transfers and post-trauma support on the empowerment of traumatized women in post-conflict Northern Uganda. They compared the separate and joint impact of cash transfers and post-trauma support on several indicators of psychological wellbeing: the level of trauma (based on sub-indicators avoidance, intrusion and hyperarousal), worry, empowerment, and perceived income opportunities. The results can be found in Table A5 in Annex 1. The impacts on these three indicators of psychological wellbeing are mixed. Cash transfers had no significant impact on trauma nor income, a positive impacts on empowerment and a negative impact on worry (more worry), but in the second wave of study only a significant impact on trauma was found (trauma decreased). Counselling had no significant impact on trauma, a significant positive impact on income and empowerment, and no significant impact on worry. In the second wave of the study the positive impact of counselling on empowerment and income were consolidated. The combination of cash transfers and counselling led to higher impacts for worry and empowerment, but with mixed impacts between the waves. Finally, there is marginal statistical evidence that adding the Self-Help Low-Cost Post-Traumatic Stress Programme (SHLCPTS) increases income, but not the other indicators of social and economic resilience of traumatized women listed above (© Van

Reisen et al., 2018). However, qualitative research that was conducted to monitor the implementation of the SHLCPTS programme indicated positive results that may not be visible in the statistics analyses due the experimental design. In study in which a more controlled experimental design was used to test the effectiveness of the SHLCPTS, the results showed (large) significant effects on all indicators of psychological well-being mentioned above (Kidane & Stokmans, 2018).

### **2.1.6 Asset accumulation**

A recurring idea about UCTs is that they are mere ‘hand-outs’, with little or no return on resources (Handa et al., 2017). This view, however, has been challenged by a number of recent studies that quantify the return on transfers via investment in productive assets and human capital. Social transfers impact on household welfare by easing budget constraints. This can have impact in the medium and long term, as an ease of budget and liquidity constraints can influence household behaviour in relation to productive assets and their risk coping strategies (Bastagli et al., 2016). In recent years, a rich body of evidence has focused on two channels through which transfers can impact on intermediate inclusive growth objectives: investment in productive assets and investment in human capital.

Regarding investment in productive assets, UNICEF, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Food Programme’s joint Transfer Project evaluated the investment behaviour of households benefiting from unconditional cash transfers throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Measuring livestock ownership, ownership of agricultural assets and agricultural inputs/outputs, positive and significant impacts were found on at least one domain in all but one evaluation (Handa et al., 2017). The strongest impact was found for Zambia’s CGP, for which significant positive impacts were found across almost all productive domains. However, it is important to note here that the CGP was the only programme evaluated and does not explicitly target labour-constrained households. Hence, their credit constraints or risks may have been less severe in the first place. Section 2.4 discusses in more detail how targeting vulnerable groups that are more credit or risk-constrained impacts on the results of interventions. Another comparative study performed by Ralston et al. (2017) on programmes in 14 countries estimates that there was a combined average increase in livestock ownership of 34%.

While most of the literature considers only cash transfers, Berhane et al. (2014; 2011) measure the impacts of a public works programme implemented under Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme. Similar to

UCTs, an increase in livestock holdings has been associated with participation in the programme. Participation in both the PSNP and HABP increased livestock holdings by 0.99 tropical livestock units. Households participating in the PSNP that also received transfers under the OFSP or HABP produced 147 kilograms more grain, obtained yields that were 297 kilograms per hectare higher and were 19.5% more likely to use fertilizer than yields of households participating in the PSNP only (Berhane et al., 2014). The public works programme in Sierra Leone also had positive results. Participating households were found to invest more in small livestock assets and the likelihood of owning goats or pigs was found to be 34% higher than for control households. Likewise, the number of poultry owned was 26% higher. One of the starkest impacts of the programme was in terms of new businesses. Treatment households were nearly four times more likely to set up a new enterprise than control households (Rosas & Sabarwal, 2016).

An impact evaluation carried out by the International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth (IPC-IG) found that cash transfers in Uganda increased livestock ownership, as well as sales and purchases of livestock (IPC-IG, 2017a). Simultaneously, beneficiary households' access to credit and resilience to shocks improved, while labour participation (including child labour) remained unchanged. All the identified studies on productive asset accumulation, predominantly focus on short term effects.

Noteworthy is Haushofer and Shapiro's (2018) evaluation of GiveDirectly. While all other positive impacts found in the endline evaluation dissipated in the three years since the programme ended, the programme appeared to have a lasting effect on asset accumulation. Compared to non-recipients in distant villages, beneficiaries had 40% more assets after three years (worth USD 422 PPP). This is equivalent to 60% of the initial transfer (USD 709 PPP).

Looking at the impact on productive assets (see Table 1), an evaluation of LEAP and NHIS in Ghana shows that both led to a significant increase in per capita land size for the poor (Pouw et al., 2017). This effect was even larger for the extreme poor, which is due to the importance of land among rural populations. Regarding other variables (productive assets, employment and unemployment), no significant impact was found at all. The evidence of the impact of the two programmes on production, thus, gives mixed results. In an earlier evaluation of LEAP, Handa et al. (2013) found an increase in the expenditure on seed.

Mixed results have also been observed in the evaluation of the Social Cash Transfer Pilot Programme (SCTPP) in Ethiopia. While the SCTPP increased the area dedicated to, and crop yield from, sorghum, it led to a

reduction in the area under barley and the crop yield of barley. The likelihood of owning many agricultural implements increased and the number of agricultural implements decreased. However, there was also an increase in the total value of production in the overall sample by around 18 percentage points and for Hintalo Wajirat, a woreda in the Tigray Region, by about 17 percentage points (Asfaw et al., 2016). Other programmes in Ethiopia, namely, the PSNP and OFSP/HABP, yielded positive results. The combination of the PSNP and OFSP/HABP led to considerable improvements in the use of fertilizer and enhanced investment in agriculture likely to improve agricultural productivity among households receiving both programmes (Hoddinott et al., 2012). In comparison, participation in the PSNP alone (without the OFSP and HABP) did not have a significant impact on productivity and input use.

In comparing the addition of weather index insurance (WII) or agricultural input coupons (AICs) to the PSNP programme in Ethiopia, Wong et al. (forthcoming) found a significant impact of both interventions on the amount of seeds purchased, although the increase was larger for adding AICs only. In addition, both interventions resulted in a larger amount of farmland rented in, and a reduced amount of farmland rented out in the case of AICs, which can indicate an increase in the use of land for productive activities. Yet, a significant increase in the total amount of inputs purchased (including fertilizer, tools, herbicides and pesticides) was only found for AICs. In comparison, the impact of the WII on the total purchase of inputs appeared to be small and insignificant.

The results indicate that vouchers like the AICs increase the purchase and use of agricultural inputs for farmers in Tigray, whereas WII does not. One of the explanations provided by the research group is that the farmers in this population are more cash/credit constrained than risk constrained. Hence, increasing their access to capital can stimulate agricultural production, rather than insuring against risk. Based on this study, it remains unclear if insurance substitutes or complements the PSNP. While AICs complement the PSNP, WII neither complements or substitutes the PSNP as a result of high poverty levels (Wong et al., forthcoming).

In Kenya, interviews with the recipients of a government-run cash transfer programme, Inua Jamii (lift the community), found that the beneficiaries established micro-enterprises and bought household assets (pers. com., 2017).<sup>4</sup> Initially, some of the recipients interviewed said they invested part of the funds received in the production and sale of doughnuts and the sale of artisanal juice, vegetables and charcoal. Income generated

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<sup>4</sup> Reports of the two forums hosted by Utafiti Sera can be found at: <http://includeplatform.net/policy-knowledge-community/utafiti-sera-social-protection-kenya/>.

from these activities assisted them to purchase household food and cover other household expenses such as rent. Ultimately, the programme resulted in asset accumulation through the purchase of land parcels and construction of household dwellings.

### 2.1.7 Savings

Increased savings as a result of social protection interventions can have two major positive impacts: households become more resilient in times of shock and stress and households possess the financial capital to invest in productive assets or their own human capital (health, education, etc.). Several impact evaluations point to the positive impacts on savings. In their investigation of the CGP and Multiple Categorical Targeting Grant in Zambia, Handa et al. (2018) found an increase in savings as a result of both programmes. Daidone et al. (2016) report a 24% increase in savings as a result of the CGP. LEAP also led to a significant increase in the likelihood of households holding savings, by 11% (Handa et al., 2013). Ralston et al. (2017) found that beneficiary households were 4 to 20% more likely to save compared to control households, which led to an increase of 9 to 92% in the amount of households with savings. In Ethiopia, Ghana and Malawi, cash transfers led to a reduction in loan and debt repayments (Daidone et al., 2016).

On the other hand, Fre (2018) found that pastoralists in the Afar region in Ethiopia who were beneficiaries of the PSNP had lower savings than non-beneficiary households (see Table A3 in Annex 1). A possible explanation is that these beneficiaries were suffering from drought, which not only prevented them from saving, but also forced them to sell their livestock due to the shortage of feed and the need for cash to purchase food.

The public works programme in Sierra Leone showed differential impacts. While there was a 16% increase in households participating in informal savings groups, there was no significant impact on formal savings (i.e. possessing a savings account, Rosas & Sabarwal, 2016). Evans et al. (2014) confirm this picture: although there was no average effect on savings, poor households saw a fivefold increase in non-bank savings (Evans et al., 2014). Evaluations of SAGE (Kuss & Gassmann, 2018) and LEAP (Pouw et al., 2017) also found positive impacts on informal credit options. Kuss and Gassmann (2018) found increased participation in formal credit options, which in turn improved the quality of these services. Hence, studying the dynamics between formal and informal savings is important in understanding the effectiveness of social protection for savings.

### 2.1.8 Labour and employment

Social protection interventions can contribute to improvements in labour or employment status in various ways. For instance, public works programmes can employ recipients directly, while transfers can enable them to invest in their employability or set up an enterprise. The impacts on labour and employment can be measured by various indicators: for example, the (un)employment rate and amount of days spent on labour indicate the impact of an intervention. The type of labour engaged in and the incidence of child labour are other impacts considered in this review.

Regarding employment, an evaluation of SAGE in Uganda concluded that the programme accounts for approximately 6 percentage points of the overall improvement in employment in SAGE districts (MoGLSD, 2016b). Moreover, the employment rate increased by 1.47% more in SAGE districts than non-SAGE districts. In Sierra Leone, households participating in a public works project were 34% more likely to have paid work after the project ended (Rosas & Sabarwal, 2016).

Based on their assessment of the long-term impact of the Progresa programme in Mexico, Parker and Vogl (2018) and Kugler and Rojas (2018) found that the programme's educational impact translates into better labour market outcomes, such as the increased probability of being employed, more hours worked and better quality employment. Moreover, they found that programme exposure starting from a young age is associated with higher positive impacts on the likelihood and quality of employment. Labour market outcomes are even better for women, who amount to 30–40% of the mean labour force participation and 50% of the mean pre-programme labour income in the research area.

In their evaluation of the LEAP programme in Ghana, Pouw et al. (2017) found that the programme had a significant, but small, negative impact on the percentage of household unemployment, which indicates that fewer participants were unemployed. Yet, remarkably, there was a significant, but small, increase in unemployment for the poor. However, there was no significant impact on the employment status of the extreme poor. These findings could indicate that the LEAP had a more positive impact on the employment of households that were already better off. This conclusion is further discussed in section 2.4.

The evidence on cash transfers shows no reduction in labour supply, but impacts on labour allocation and time use. Handa et al. (2017) found that households switch between different income-generating activities or between labour, domestic tasks and leisure. In Uganda, households shift from subsistence farming to

surplus farming (Kuss & Gassmann, 2018). Blattman et al. (2014) found a 17% increase in total time spent working. This effect was largely due to increases in non-agricultural work, such as skilled trades (134% increase) and high-skilled wage labour (51% increase).

Cash transfers, thus, give households the flexibility to switch from casual agricultural labour to on-farm labour and other activities (Davis et al. 2016). Handa et al. (2013) found an increase in labour supplied to the farm and a reduction in labour hired in. This reduction is lower than the increase in own labour. Another type of flexibility is found by Bosch and Shady (2019) in assessing welfare payments in Ecuador. They found no decreases in total labour, but did see some small reallocation from working in the formal to the informal sector. This idea of labour flexibility (defined as the opportunity to switch between labour activities) is partly confirmed by a study on the addition of WII or AICs to the PSNP in Ethiopia. Wong et al. (forthcoming) found that both interventions reduced (although not significantly) the amount of labour days that farmers spent on farm work. All labour indicators (preparation, sowing, cultivation and harvesting) showed a decline in the amount of days spent, with the exception of labour days on harvesting under WII, which showed a slight, non-significant increase (Wong et al., forthcoming). Although not investigated, there is a likelihood that the additional time is spent on diversifying income generation strategies.

This flexibility has several effects. First, it allows households to spread risks more effectively. The comparative study of Daidone et al. (2016) found an increase in non-farm enterprises by 16% and 5% in Zambia and Zimbabwe, respectively. In Zimbabwe, there was a 5% increase in the amount of businesses reporting profit (Daidone et al., 2016). Yet, the evaluators did not find such increases in the other countries studied. Second, flexibility may lead to higher prices for labour. The AIC intervention studied by Wong et al. (forthcoming) increased the cost of labour by 97.73 Ethiopian birr per month, which is the equivalent of the cost of approximately three days labour before the transfer. The increased cost of labour and reduced amount used indicate a substitution effect of vouchers: due to the transfer, farmers may hire more labour and engage in other non-farm activities. Finally, flexibility can also impact on intra-household labour allocation. In SCG households, more households engaged in wage labour activities (Kuss & Gassmann, 2018).

Ethiopia's SCTPP shows different labour impacts across age groups. Children between 6–12 years old worked fewer hours per day on farms and on other activities compared to control households (Asfaw et al., 2016). Boys between ages 13–17 worked fewer days in wage labour compared to the overall sample. Hence,

impacts on child labour can be considered positive. Adults (both males and females) worked fewer days in non-farm enterprises, while women worked more days and were more likely to engage in wage labour (Asfaw et al., 2016).

The long-term impact on employment is less clear. In their study of YOP in Uganda, Blattman et al. (2018) found that after nine years the treated sample spent twice as much time in skilled trade and were twice as likely to be working primarily in skilled trades than the control group. Yet, the effect on employment hours after four years was not sustained. The lack of other studies prevents the drawing of more robust and generalized conclusions on the long-term impacts on employment.

### **2.1.9 Household income**

Regarding the direct and indirect impacts of social protection interventions on income, evaluations show positive results. Handa et al. (2018) relied on experimental data to measure the long-term effects of two unconditional cash transfer programmes run by the Zambian government: the CGP and the Multiple Category Targeted Grant (MCTG). On average, the income multiplier was estimated at 1.67, meaning that recipient households translated each Kwacha transferred into an additional income of 0.67 Kwacha (Handa et al. 2018).

Several studies confirmed a rise in household income. The SAGE evaluation found that median wages increased 3.61 times more for SAGE districts than for non-SAGE districts and that the net positive effect of SAGE on the median wage was an increase of 80% (MoGLSD, 2016b). In Sierra Leone, households participating in public works increased their incomes by 26% (Rosas & Sabarwal, 2016). These effects are even stronger for rural households. A public works programme in Ghana resulted in a 5.3% decrease in extreme poverty compared to non-beneficiary households. In Zambia, 71% of the CGP households do not consider themselves very poor, compared to 35% of control households (American Institutes for Research, 2013). Five times more CGP households than control households reported being better off now than they were 12 months ago, a 45 percentage point increase.

Blattman et al. (2014) found a 38% increase in income as a result of the YOP and an approximately 20% increase in earnings per hour, but in a latter study found that these impacts had dissipated. They attribute the higher income for the treatment group mainly to the higher amount of durable assets. The authors conclude that the grants provided through the YOP “acted more as a kick-start than a lift out of poverty.

Grantees' investment leveled off; controls eventually increased their incomes through business and casual labor; and so both groups converged in employment, earnings, and consumption" (Blattman et al., 2018, p. 1).

#### 2.1.10 Analysis

The evaluations presented in this section show a generally positive picture emerging from the economic and social factors contributing to inclusive growth. As shown in table 2, most evaluations show positive outcomes. Very few studies show negative outcomes, while several studies show mixed, insignificant, neutral or unclear outcomes. This picture emerges for both social and economic outcomes. When comparing the number of positive outcomes to other and negative outcomes, the most positive outcome ratios are for food security and income.

However, such an assessment of the impact of social protection programmes, based on frequency analysis, is disputable for many reasons. These include, amongst others:

- the subjectivity of interpreting results along three categories;
- the treatment of all evaluations as equally valuable;
- the denial of the size of positive or negative outcomes;
- the grouping of multiple indicators under a single outcome category, while almost all categories have been studied using multiple indicators;

Therefore, we argue that this table should be read as an indication of the results of impact evaluations only, rather than as evidence of the effectiveness of social protection. A thorough reading of the various evaluations is required to adequately assess programme effectiveness.

**Table 2. Overview of impacts of various social protection programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa at the household level**

Country	Programme	Type	Source	Social outcomes						Economic outcomes				
				Food security	Consumption	Psychological wellbeing	Education	Health	Other	Productive assets	Savings	Labour/employment	Land	Income
Ghana	LEAP	CCT (UCT for those aged 65+)	Pouw et al. (2017); Pouw et al. (2018)	+				+				+	+-	+
			Handa et al. (2017)	+-	+-		+			+-		+-		
			Handa et al. (2013)		+-		+	+-		+	+		+	
	NHIS	Health insurance	Pouw et al. (2017)	+-				+				+-	+	
	LIPW	Public works	Osei-Akoto et al. (n.d.)	+	+		+					+		+
	GUP	Graduation	Banerjee et al. (2015)	+	+			+-	+- (women's decision-making)	+	+			+
Uganda	SAGE – SCG	UCT	Dietrich et al. (2017a); Kuss et	+		+	+					+		+

			al. (2018a; 2018b)										
<b>SAGE – VFSG</b>	UCT		 Dietrich et al. (2017a)	+		+	+-					+	+
<b>SAGE</b>	UCT		MoGLSD (2016b)	+		+	+	+				+	+
<b>YOP</b>	CCT		Blattman et al. (2018)		+-		+-	+-	+- (Mortality, fertility)	+-		+	+-
			Blattman et al. (2014)		+				+- (Social cohesion, anti-social behaviour)	+		+	+
<b>n.a.</b>	Food assistance		Rawat et al. (2014)	+				+					
<b>n.a.</b>	UCT		 Van Reisen et al. (2018)			+		+- (Worry)	+- (trauma)	+- (Empowerment)			+-
<b>n.a.</b>	Trauma support		 Van Reisen et al. (2018)			+- (Worry)		+- (trauma)	+	+			+
<b>SHLCPTS</b>	(Self-help) trauma		 Van Reisen et al. (2018)			+- (Worry)		+- (trauma)	+- (Empowerment)				+-

		support													
Ethiopia	PSNP	UCT + public works + food transfers	Fre (2018)	+	+-					-	-			-	
	PSNP + AIC	PSNP + voucher	Wong et al. (forthcoming)							+		+-	+		
	PSNP + WII	PSNP + insurance	Wong et al. (forthcoming)							+-		+-	+-		
	PSNP + HABP	PSNP + asset building	Berhane et al. (2014)	+						+					
	PSNP + OFSP/HABP	PSNP + credit/business assistance/ asset building	Berhane et al. (2011)	+						+					
	SCTPP	UCT	Asfaw et al. (2016)	+						+	(Child labour, social networks, trust)	+-		+-	
				Berhane et al. (2015)	+				+-			+-		-	

	n.a.	Graduation	Banerjee et al. (2015)	+	+			+/-	+/- (women's decision-making)	+	+			+
Kenya	FMS-FPC	Maternal health services	Merten (2018)					+ (Ante- and postnatal care visits, skilled deliveries, health care expenses, out-of-pocket payments)						
		Maternal health services	Elbers et al. (2018)					+ (Ante- and postnatal care visits, skilled deliveries, health care expenses, out-of-pocket payments)						
	TCHP	Health insurance	Elbers et al. (2018)					+ (Health care expenses, facility visits)						
	OBA	Maternal health vouchers	Merten (2018)					+ (Ante- and postnatal care visits, skilled deliveries)						
	CT-OVC	UCT	Handa et al. (2017)	+	+		+				+/-		+/-	
	GiveDirectly	UCT	Haushofer & Shapiro (2018)	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/-	+/- (Women empowerment)	+				

			Haushofer & Shapiro (2016)	+	+	+	+/-	+/-	+/- (Women empowerment)	+				+
Lesotho	CGP	UCT	Gupta et al. (2016)				+	+	+/- (Fit enough to work)					+
			Daidone et al. (2014)							+/-		+/-		
			Pellerano et al. (2014)	+	+		+	+	+	(Child wellbeing, clothing, footwear)	+/-	+/-	+/-	
Zambia	CGP	UCT	Handa et al. (2016a)				+					+		
			Seidenfeld et al., 2014	+	+		+							
		American Institutes for Research (2013)	+	+			+			+		+		+
	MCTG	UCT	Handa et al. (2018)		+					+	+			
		American	+	+		+				+		+/-		

			Institutes for Research (2014a)										
Zimbabwe	HSCT	UCT	Daidone et al. (2018)	+					+	+	+ (operating non-agricultural enterprise)		
			Dewbre et al., 2015)	+/-	+				+/-		+/-		
			American Institutes for Research (2014b)	+/-	+		+/-						
Malawi	SCTP	UCT	University of North Carolina (2016)	+	+		+		+		+/-		
			Asfaw et al. (2015)	+				+	+		+ (Child labour)	+/-	
	SCTP + FISP	UCT + CCT	Daidone et al. (2017)	+	+				+				
	MSAF	Public works	Beegle et al. (2015)	-						+			
	n.a.	UCT +	Baird et al.				+	+/-	+/-	+	+/-		

		CCT	(2016)					(HIV prevalence)	(Pregnancy, early marriage and women empowerment)					
Sierra Leone	YESP	Public works	Rosas & Sabarwal (2016)	+	+		- (school absenteeism)	+	+ (Child labour)	+	+	+		+
Democratic Republic of Congo	n.a.	UCT	Aker (2013)	+						+				+
	n.a.	Food voucher	Aker (2013)	+						+				+
Niger	NSNP	UCT	Premand et al. (2017)	+		+-	+-	+						
Tanzania	n.a.	CCT	Evans et al. (2014)		+-		+	+		+	+-			

+ indicates a significant positive effect;  
 - indicates a significant negative effect;  
 +- indicates a mixed, insignificant, neutral or unclear outcome;  
 n.a. indicates that the programme name is not available

This section has outlined the range and directions of impacts that social protection programmes have (had) in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most of them have evaluated programmes that contained UCT (36 interventions) or CCT (8 interventions). Some studies show the positive impacts of cash transfers dissipating over time. This gives reason to debate the long-term impact of cash transfers (see Box 2).

**Box 26. Long-term impacts of cash transfers: transforming or dissipating?**

Recently, there has been debate about the long-term impact of cash transfer programmes. Haushofer and Shapiro’s (2018) study showed that programmes that have positive impacts measured through endline evaluations may lose this impact over time. This is particularly true when spillover effects are measured outside the research area. Haushofer and Shapiro’s reason for concern mostly came from negative spillover effects to neighbouring villages. Except for asset accumulation, the only significant outcomes of their across-village evaluation were negative (food security and psychological wellbeing). In addition, evaluations within villages showed that the positive impacts measured in the endline evaluation dissipated over time (Haushofer & Shapiro, 2016 and 2018). Together with the finding of Baird et al. (2016) on the dissipating effects of a CCT for school-aged girls, these outcomes are reason for concern.

Yet, when using microsimulation models of future benefits of existing programmes, monetary returns appear to increase over time, when returns on human capital accumulation are taken into account. Mideros et al. (2016) investigated the mid and long-term impacts of social assistance cash transfers in Cambodia. Through the channels of education and its returns in the form of higher wages, Mideros et al. (2016) estimated that the rates of return would turn positive after 12 years and reach between 12 and 15% after 20 years in two alternative policy scenarios. A similar study in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa was conducted by Dietrich et al. (2017b), which simulated a nationwide rollout of SAGE transfers in Uganda. In terms of the impacts of increased education attainment, the monetary returns increase over time and the rate of return eventually turns positive if social welfare is taken into account. Gupta et al. (2016) concluded that the benefits of the CGP in Lesotho exceed the costs over a 10-year period, largely because of increasing returns to capital: out of the 42.1 million Lesotho loti in benefits, 14.6 were caused by the spillover effects of education, assets and social networks.

When interpreting the dissipating or even negative impacts of cash transfers found in Haushofer and Shapiro (2018) and Baird et al. (2016), one must keep in mind an important way in which the two programmes studied differ from those that have yielded positive impacts over the long-term. Neither of the programmes provided long-term, regular and predictable cash transfers. Haushofer and Shapiro (2018) experimented with assigning the transfer as a lump-sum payment or a series of nine monthly instalments. Baird et al. (2016) provided transfers for a period of only one school year. The difference between short-term, ad-hoc cash benefits and regular, predictable programmes might be critical in explaining negative impacts, in line with the importance of the length of exposure.

Assessing the long-term impacts and the overall returns on social protection is a rather challenging task. Ex-post impact evaluations would have to run over a long period to adequately measure outcomes, which is costly and time-consuming and, thus, rarely done. Ex-ante evaluations rely on microsimulation models, which are likely to be underestimated, as a simplified model of reality cannot capture the multitude of interactions between income and household behaviour. To date, the majority of research shows positive and lasting impacts of regular and predictable social assistance transfers, but some recent studies observe dissipating effects when it comes to short-term cash interventions. Findings to date indicate that the length of exposure to programmes and the predictability of cash transfers might play a critical role in a household’s ability to translate cash transfers into productivity gains over the longer term. Hence, further research should aim to understand the design features and conditions under which social protection can yield positive returns, and the factors that contribute to evaporating or unintended negative impacts.

## 2.2 At the community level

Easing the budget constraints of households has effects reaching beyond direct recipients. An increase in a beneficiary household's purchasing power raises the demand for goods and services, thereby stimulating the local economy. In order to meet boosted local demand, non-beneficiary households may increase their production, expanding the meso-level economy (Taylor et al., 2014a; 2014b). If increased demand is not sufficiently met by increases in the supply of goods, this results in inflation. The impact of social protection on inclusive growth at the community level, thus, depends on the income multiplier and inflation rate at the community level. Moreover, social impacts at the community level can be recognized, such as increased social cohesion, more community meetings and the establishment of various institutions. These impacts are outlined in this section.

### 2.2.1 Income multipliers


Income multipliers calculate the extent to which a certain amount of money transferred generates a return in income in the local economy. A multiplier larger than one indicates income larger than the size of the transfer. Several impact evaluations have been carried out in the Sub-Saharan context to measure these local economy spillovers using a so-called local economy-wide impact evaluation (LEWIE) model.

Thome et al. (2016) used LEWIE to evaluate seven national programmes in seven African countries. In the case of the SCTPP in Ethiopia and the Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC) in Kenya, they also measured nominal income multipliers (NIMs) in more than one area: Abi-Adi and Hintalo in Ethiopia and Garissa and Nyanza in Kenya. All programmes resulted in positive multiplier effects on the local economy. The spillover effects of programmes to non-beneficiaries appear to be large. As shown in Figure 4, the range of income multipliers varies from 1.27 in Malawi to 2.52 in Hintalo, Ethiopia.

All of these evaluations support the claim that social transfers are important injections of cash into local economies, creating spillover effects for non-beneficiary groups. Such spillover effects can also be measured through indicators other than income: they have also been reported in the form of newly created jobs, as beneficiaries were enabled to pay for labour on their farms (Kuss & Gassmann, 2018).

As shown by Thome et al. (2016), in the case of the SCTPP in Ethiopia and CT-OVC in Kenya, the same programmes can result in different income multipliers depending on contextual factors, such as the socio-economic and socio-cultural conditions in the area of implementation. Moreover, methodological choices can also lead to large differences in the range of multipliers. This is demonstrated by calculations of income multipliers in the CGP in Lesotho: in their simulation, Filipski et al. (2015) found that an increase of 1 Lesotho loti in household income led to an increase of 1.53 in real income. In their experiment, Gupta et al. (2015) found a much larger income multiplier of 2.84. The difference can be explained by the fact that Filipski’s simulation did not account for the multiplying effects of asset accumulation. In their 10-year projection, including discounting for lower costs and spillover effects, Gupta et al. (2016) found that the CGP results in a multiplier of 1.88, which implies that every 1 Lesotho loti invested over those 10 years will yield an additional income of 0.88 Lesotho loti.

**Figure 4. Nominal and real income multipliers (with 95% confidence interval)**




Source: Thome et al. (2016)

Income multipliers are caused by spillover effects in the local economy, mostly through increased production and consumption. The production multipliers can, therefore, be considered an intermediary indicator of the impact of social protection programmes on inclusive growth. An important conclusion is that crop production multipliers “are disproportionately large in areas where

local crops constitute a significant consumption share and their price is influenced by local supply and demand” (Thome et al., 2016, p. 19). Examples of such areas are in Ghana and Zambia, with large crop production multipliers (see Figure 5 below). Arndt et al. (2014) conclude that the indirect benefits through factor returns and falling food prices account for 40% of the total benefits of the Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP) in Malawi.

Looking at disaggregated multipliers per sector, Thome et al. (2016) found support for the Dutch Disease hypothesis, which purports that the introduction of a cash transfer leads to an increase in the production of non-tradables (defined by Thome et al. as local goods and services that are imperfect substitutes for those that can be obtained outside local markets), while the production of tradable goods and services decrease (see Figure 5). This may explain the decrease in activities in Ethiopia and Kenya. As these activities are part of integrated markets, prices do not increase as a result of the cash transfers. Hence, households allocate resources to sectors where prices rise (such as retail or service sectors).


**Figure 5. Production multipliers disaggregated by activity per programme**



Source: Thome et al., 2016

Moreover, spillovers to non-beneficiaries can be much larger than to beneficiary households (see Figure 6). In the case of all eight programmes studied by Thome et al. (2016), the spillover effect on eligible households is smaller than their share of the population for the intervention. This can partly be explained by the eligibility criteria: cash transfers are often targeted at poor households with few assets. Hence, factor endowments can explain the relatively large multiplier effect on non-beneficiary households, as they often have surplus labour or other assets.

**Figure 6. Distribution of NIMs among eligible and ineligible households**



Source: Thome et al., 2016

### 2.2.2 Inflation

Increases in income may also result in higher prices, due to higher demand in local markets. One of the concerns about the impact of boosting social protection interventions on local economies is that the supply of goods cannot keep up with the increasing demand, leading to price inflation. Price inflation can also be caused if markets are constrained or isolated. Especially if transfers are injected into small communities in remote areas, this can lead to inflation in local markets. Kuss and Gassmann (2018) found a price increase in transport services around SCG payment days, indicating that the transfer had an inflation effect.

To measure the impact of inflation on the local economy because of an intervention, instead of using NIMs, real income multipliers (RIMs) are used (NIMs are corrected for price indexes whereas RIMs

are not). As shown in Figure 4, in all 8 situations the RIM is lower than the NIM. This indicates that throughout the intervention period, all areas have experienced inflation. As shown in the figure, all RIMs are substantially lower than the NIMs. Yet, the RIMs are still positive (ranging from 1.08 in Nyanza, Kenya to 1.81 in Hintalo, Ethiopia), indicating the positive spillover effects of transfers.

Moreover, inflation in the local economy does not have to be the result of social protection interventions, but can be linked to macro-economic development. Most Sub-Saharan Africa countries have experienced high rates of inflation, regardless of social protection. Since 2012, Sub-Saharan Africa has had an average annual inflation rate of 8.07%, which explains at least a substantial part of the RIMs found by Thome et al. (2016). In their assessment of purchasing prices under UCT programmes, Handa et al. (2017) used a basket of 10 standard goods in 7 countries. They found no significant impact on the prices for 69 out of 70 goods (there was a weakly significant impact on the community-level price of beef in Lesotho).

Finally, the more integrated a local economy is with outside markets, the smaller the potential inflationary impact of social cash transfer programmes will be, because increases in local demand are met by outside markets instead of putting upward pressure on local prices. Hence, social protection programmes can have fewer disruptive impacts when accompanied by market integration policies.

### 2.2.3 Social impacts

Studies of the social impacts of programmes all point to positive or neutral impacts. One concern of economists is the crowding out-theory, suggesting that rising public spending (such as social protection expenses) drives down private spending. Berhane et al. (2011; 2014) found no evidence for the crowding out of private transfers. Kuss and Gassmann (2018) and Pouw et al. (2017) found an increase, rather than a decrease, in the amount of informal savings.

All other evaluations assessed in this review found various, positive social impacts at the community level. Daidone et al. (2014) found increases in the sharing arrangements for CGP recipients, particularly around food. They found an increase in the probability of receiving informal in-kind support from family members, friends or neighbours. In general, Daidone et al. (2018) and Handa et al. (2013) conclude that beneficiaries engage in new or old social networks or strengthen existing ones. Evans et al. (2014) found that treatment households were more likely to attend village council

meetings, contribute labour to community development projects and express trust in a range of community members. Pouw et al. (2018) found increased social support, trust and feelings of being recognized as citizens in Ghanaian and Kenyan communities where social protection was perceived as well-targeted to the ‘deserving poor’.

The United Nations report *Promoting Inclusion through Social Protection* outlines various ways in which and examples of how social protection can promote inclusion (United Nations, 2018). The question is not if, but how, and under which conditions social protection can promote inclusion. Even more essential for drawing conclusions on social impacts is the context. While certain interventions can stimulate social cohesion in one area, it can erode cohesion and cause conflict in others. A prime example is outlined by Bau (2018), who distinguishes the impacts of social pensions in Ghana and Indonesia based on matrilocality or patrilocality in local cultures.<sup>5</sup> Bau concludes that women born into matrilocally-inclined families and men born into patrilocally-inclined families experience drops in the likelihood of completing primary, secondary and tertiary education after the introduction of a social pension. This relates to the lower likelihood of them living with their parents, which can be the result of pensions making support from children obsolete.

### 2.3 Explaining mixed results

The extent to which social protection contributes to achieving growth objectives relies on both external and internal factors. Social protection does not exist in a vacuum, but interacts with a multitude of external factors, such as socio-economic country characteristics and sectoral policies (such as for agriculture, labour, health, education). The country or local context largely determines the extent and channels through which social protection programmes contribute to growth, both at the household and community level. Internal factors affecting the outcomes of social protection refer to programme design and implementation, and how well these aspects are aligned with the local context. External and internal factors are sources of heterogeneous effects of social protection interventions.

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<sup>5</sup> Matrilocality involves a married couple living with the wife’s parents, while patrilocality implies them living with the husband’s parents.

### 2.3.1 External factors

Recent literature conceptualizes the external factors as either constraints and mediators (Bastagli et al., 2016; Veras Soares et al., 2017) or structural and behavioural barriers (Roelen et al., 2017). These factors are present at the household level, local level or country level (Bastagli et al., 2016). While the range of constraints and mediators is very broad, some general examples are pre-transfer levels of social and human capital, access to services, level of market integration, and sources of livelihood and employment opportunities (Bastagli et al., 2016). They enable households to or limit them from investing in productive and human capital and, thereby, have far-reaching implications for the economic returns of social cash transfers.

Such heterogeneity arising from external constraints and mediators is captured in the academic literature. For example, other policies at various levels influence the impact of social protection programmes. In the Ugandan context, where primary education has been universally free since 1997, Dietrich et al. (2017b) found no effect of higher household income on the probability of school enrolment and a relatively small impact on school continuation. This is explained by the success of Uganda's education policies over the last two decades. In a similar model for Cambodia, Mideros et al. (2016) predict a 1% increase in (national) average years of schooling 10 years after the introduction of social protection measures, suggesting that in the Cambodian context there is more room for social protection to influence household investments in education. In addition, Elbers et al. (2018) found that part of the increase in access to health facilities cannot be attributed to the FMS-FPC, but to the general trend of improved access before the introduction of the programme.

In the domain of health care, Handa et al. (2016a; 2016b) observed that cash transfers increased the rate of skilled birth attendants attending the births of Zambian mothers, but only in communities with access to quality health care services. Similarly, Merten (2018), Pouw et al. (2017) and Elbers et al. (2018) point to the quality of health services as mediating factors. The Zambian cash transfer was found to have reduced stunting among children, but only in households with access to a protected water source (Seidenfeld, 2014).

Kuss et al. (2018) identified the level of market integration as a contextual factor causing heterogeneity in local economy spillover effects. Locations with low market integration experienced a lower spillover of positive externalities, and injecting cash into the local economy was found to

even magnify pre-existing inequalities in the market structures. Aggregate results can easily mask such heterogeneity.

### 2.3.2 Internal factors

Not only external factors, but also programme design and implementation features are causes of substantial heterogeneity in programme effects. Several of these features are outlined earlier in Box 2 as explanatory factors for differences in the long-term impacts of cash transfers. For instance, higher transfer values have been associated with large improvements in educational test scores by Manley et al. (2015), and the length of exposure to transfers is positively correlated with the length of education (Villa, 2014). Berhane et al. (2014) also found significant effects of the length of exposure to transfers on productive asset holding and food security, and Kugler and Rojas (2018) and Parker and Vogl (2018) reported a statistically significant impact of length of exposure on the long-term economic impacts of cash transfers. The effect of payment modality choices on how transfers are consumed shows mixed evidence: an experiment by Brune et al. (2017) found no significant effects on consumption patterns between mobile and cash transfers, but Blumenstock et al. (2015) observed an increase in spending following a transition to mobile payment modalities. Haushofer and Shapiro (2016) also found that lump-sum payments can have different impacts than regular, monthly transfers. They found that lump-sum payments led to a higher level of asset holdings, while regular transfers increased food security. This is explained by the credit and savings constraints that

#### **Box 41. Context-specificity of implementation of the PSNP in the Afar region, Ethiopia**

Table 2 shows how positive outcomes of the PSNP at the (sub)-national level contrast with the negative results identified by Fre (2018) in his study in the Afar region of Ethiopia. The results reveal a negative and significant difference in income, savings and livestock for participating households compared to control households (Fre, 2018; see Table A3 in Annex 1). In the case of income, this can be explained by the fact that in the PSNP the monthly income of non-beneficiary households was higher than that of beneficiary households. In terms of consumption expenditure, the results point in no clear direction.

However, the qualitative component of the study found that the PSNP contributed to the protection of household productive assets. The food provided by the intervention during drought enabled households to meet their food needs and not have to sell their assets, mostly livestock, to purchase food (Fre, 2018).

The Afar region is characterized by multifaceted and interlocking disadvantages (shocks), including extended droughts, food shortages, loss of livestock, flooding, death of family member(s) and bankruptcy. These initial conditions probably explain why the survey component of the study revealed a negative and significant difference in income and saving between PSNP beneficiary and non-beneficiary households. Notably, non-beneficiary households had a higher income and savings. Secondly, the conservation practices under the PSNP public works programme were not clearly linked to people’s pastoral livelihoods and the environmental conditions of the villages.

households with regular transfers face, preventing them from saving to invest in assets (such as metal roofs). Apparently the transfer is unable to alleviate these constraints.

There is an important lesson to be learnt from the heterogeneity of effects of social protection interventions. There are no ‘silver bullets’ that will bring about the same positive changes in all settings. The context in which social protection programme operates and the design of the programme determines its success to a great extent. Programmes that are able to resonate with the specific needs, risks and vulnerabilities of the target population will be the most likely to achieve success. Particularly, unconditional cash transfer programmes can lead to different outcomes in different contexts, as households choose how and what to invest in. Given the diversified income generating strategies of households and the different constraints they face, different investments of transfers can be expected. For instance, Handa et al. (2017) conclude that households in Lesotho and Ethiopia are more reliant on livestock production than those in Zambia or Malawi and, thus, we may expect impacts on livestock in the former, rather than the latter countries. In general, unconditional and conditional transfers lead to different outcomes. Although very few studies have compared the two, an assessment of different delivery mechanisms in Burkina Faso concluded that, on average, CCTs lead to better health outcomes, girls’ school attendance and quality of housing than UCTs, while UCTs lead to higher outcomes on entrepreneurship (Akresh, De Walque & Kazianga, 2016). No significant differences in results on education and child labour are found.

## **2.4 Potential for vulnerable groups**

In their study on the relationship between social protection and inequality reduction, Bhorat et al. (2017) argue that effective targeting of those in the poorest income quintile and an increase in the value of the transfer to this group, rather than improvement in coverage rates, had the highest potential for social protection to reduce inequality. Currently, they argue, coverage rates are too low to significantly reduce inequality.

Despite the fact that most beneficiaries of social safety nets are in the lowest income quintiles (see Figure 3), the coverage rate among the very poor is low. A key concern is how to target the poor (see section 3.2), and other specific vulnerable groups in society. This section outlines these challenges for four dimensions of vulnerability: income/assets, gender, age and area. Hence, we discuss the

effectiveness of (and difficulty with) targeting the poor, women, children, the elderly and people living in remote areas.

#### 2.4.1 The extreme poor

Reaching the most vulnerable groups of a population, particularly in contexts of high informality, with low infrastructural integration and in scattered rural settlements is a difficult task. In a study of microcredits in Benin, Altaf and Pouw (2017) identified challenges in defining, targeting and reaching the very poor. This is due to a complicated process of exclusion, in which inappropriate targeting methods, elite capture, and the psychological dimensions of poverty interact. The authors emphasize the need for targeting based on a deep understanding of who the poor are in any given context and the importance of incorporating understandings of mental health and disability and of social-relations aspects. The imperativeness of appropriately defining the target group is also noted by Schubert (2017), who suggests a well-documented approach of trial and error to ensure reaching vulnerable and poor groups.

Pouw et al. (2017) conclude that the results of the LEAP and NHIS in Ghana show that cash transfers and national health insurance have a high potential for the extreme poor. Especially land ownership largely increased for the extreme poor due to both programmes. However, the results for child health show that the targeting of the NHIS requires additional attention, as the extreme poor benefited the least in terms of child health, as shown in Table A1 in Annex 1.

Elbers et al. (2018) also conclude that social protection programmes can have a high potential for the poorest households. For instance, the percentage of poor households making catastrophic health expenses decreased from 6.6% in 2003 to 1.5% in 2013, with a decrease from 3.7% to 0.9% for the total population. Yet, similarly, Elbers et al. (2018) conclude that the impact on wellbeing requires effective targeting. One of their reasons for concern is that the absolute increase in the number of skilled deliveries between 2003 and 2014 was higher for the richer quintiles of women than for the poorer quintiles: skilled deliveries increased from 75–93% for the richest quintile and from 17–31% for the lowest quintile. All groups show an absolute increase in the use of skilled deliveries, but mother's education remains an important factor for skilled delivery, as well nutritional status and reduced exposure to illnesses for the child. Moreover, despite the decrease in out-of-pocket payments outlined above, the percentage of poorest households incurring these expenses was lower

(0.9%) before the introduction of the programmes. Hence, the question remains if the improved health indicators are the results of the social protection programmes or caused by other elements of socio-economic development. The research group concludes that, “on average, the wealthier, the residents of urban areas and the higher educated mothers benefitted more and experienced larger improvements compared to the poor, residents from rural areas and less educated women respectively” (Elbers et al., 2018, p. 4).

On the other hand, Fre (2018) found that the participation in the PSNP was highest for female-headed households, households with older and illiterate household heads, large households, and households engaged in agro-pastoral activities (see Table A2 in Annex 1). Wong et al. (forthcoming) also found that, when subsidized, farmers are willing to receive WII next to the PSNP. This indicates that self-exclusion is not necessarily the main factor in the relatively low impact of cash transfers on the poor.

Hence, the issue of targeting needs to be more critically examined. Several of these studies show that programmes targeting the poor have trouble reaching the poor and may enlarge, rather than decrease, inequality. Arguably, introducing universal programmes can overcome much of the exclusion errors and be more effective in reaching the poor. On the other hand, universal programmes may fare unfavourably if (short-term) cost efficiency is an important factor. Countries with low government revenue can find it difficult to mobilize sufficient resources. While standard political economy models conclude that universal programmes are more sustainable in the long run (Gelbach & Pritchett, 2002; Pritchett, 2005; Moene & Wallerstein, 2001), research from Zambia has shown that population preferences may favour targeted programs (Schüring & Gassmann, 2016). This discussion is further outlined section 3.2 on the cost effectiveness of universal and targeted programmes.

However, several programmes do show important results when specifically targeting the poor. For instance, 32% of extremely poor households under the Labour Intensive Public Works (LIPW) programme in Ghana had at least one member working in the project, which substantially decreased extreme poverty (Osei-Akoto et al., n.d.). Evans et al. (2014) also had promising results for the poorest half of the treatment households. They found a half-day per month reduction in sick days averaging across all ages, and a full day for poor children aged 0–4.

It is important to specifically look at the large set of constraints that poor households face in moving out of poverty. This is illustrated by the different impacts of WII in Ghana and Ethiopia. While Karlan et al. (2014) found WII to be effective in reducing risk constraints for farmers in northern Ghana, Wong et al. (forthcoming) found few productive impacts of the insurance, as the farming population in Tigray, Ethiopia was more cash/credit-constrained than risk-constrained. Therefore, providing agricultural input subsidies proved to be more effective for increasing the productivity of these farmers. Hence, understanding the specific constraints faced by poor people in their specific contexts is key to optimizing a targeted approach.

#### 2.4.2 Children

Several studies discussed in the previous paragraphs such as on education (section 2.1.3) and health (section 2.1.4) have disaggregate the impacts of programmes on the wellbeing of children. Pouw et al. (2017) found that, in Ghana, LEAP in combination with NHIS has led to improvements in several of the anthropometric measures of child health, i.e. weight-for-age, height-for-age and weight-for-height. The joint effect of LEAP and NHIS on these anthropometric measures was significantly positive, indicating that the cash transfers and health insurance complement each other well (see Table A6 in the Annex 1). In their investigation of World Food Programme interventions in Northern Uganda's camps for internationally displaced people, Alderman et al. (2012) found that providing children with breakfast and lunch (or an equivalent to take home) increased school enrolment by 9%.

In terms of evaluations of programmes specifically targeting children, Pellerano et al. (2014) found that Lesotho's CGP resulted in a 5% increase in school enrolment. Zambia's CGP led to increases of 7% and 5% in the number of children enrolled in and attending primary school, respectively (American Institutes for Research, 2014a), and Taylor et al. (2013) found a 19% increase for primary school-age children living far away from school. The CGP and school feeding programmes further positively impacted on education outcomes such as school retention and ownership of uniforms and shoes (Pellerano et al., 2014), grade retention and dropout rates (Alderman et al., 2012).

Social protection can further contribute to children's wellbeing through its impact on child labour. Additional income through social protection can reduce the need for children to engage in work. The 2016 study by Asfaw et al. showed a decrease in child labour for households participating in the

unconditional SCTPP, as outlined earlier. Moreover, cash transfers conditional on school attendance for children can also reduce child labour. As outlined in the comparative study done on cash transfers by the International Labour Organization (2010):

*In Colombia, Familias en Acción is reported to have reduced child labour in rural areas. Similar effects have been reported from Nicaragua's Red de Protección 15 Social, Ecuador's Bonode Desarrollo Humano, and Brazil's Child Labour Eradication Programme. In Mexico, studies found small reductions in child labour. This suggests an increasing opportunity cost of schooling, i.e. income opportunities forgone for the household, as children grow older. Similar results are reported from Costa Rica's Superémonos, Brazil's Bolsa Familia. (International Labour Organization, 2010b, p viii)*

### 2.4.3 Women

The gender impacts of social protection programmes are not always taken into account, particularly for universal programmes. Yet, universal programmes may have adverse effects on the wellbeing and position of women: according to Newton (2016), social protection can reinforce traditional gender stereotypes if a 'gender lens' is not applied. Applying a gender lens can be done in the programme design (i.e. integrating complementary interventions such as awareness training about the social norms underlying gender inequalities), ensuring better linkages to other services (such as health and education) and separate programmes aimed at capacity building at the grassroots level (Newton, 2016).

An example of a targeted programme has been studied by Van Reisen et al. (2018), who found that providing cash and counselling to traumatized women in Northern Uganda can increase their incomes and, in some cases, their psychological wellbeing. Social protection programmes not specifically targeted towards women also show promising results. In Sierra Leone, a public works programme led to higher female labour participation, particularly for households in rural areas or with low education (Rosas & Sabarwal, 2016). Blattman et al. (2014) outline how women in Uganda began poorer at the start of the YOP, but ended at similar levels as men. The authors also conclude that women's work and earnings would stagnate without the programme. In their follow up assessment, Blattman et al. (2018) found that women in control households had begun to catch up in investment, employment and earnings. These results indicate that social protection programmes that are pro-poor can also be pro-women. Yet, as outlined by Newton (2016), careful attention needs to be paid to the targeting of women, particularly those in need of psychosocial support, to prevent gender inequality from increasing.

#### 2.4.4 Elderly people

Pensions are on the rise in Sub-Saharan Africa: currently, 29–61% of total social protection budgets in the region go to old-age social pensions (Güven & Leite, 2016). These pensions are non-contributory and not linked to past contributions, earnings or years worked. Sub-Saharan Africa, therefore, has one of the highest coverage rates for social pensions compared to other regions in the world.

Old-age social pensions can contribute significantly to poverty eradication and inequality reduction. In Mauritius and South Africa they have contributed to an approximately 30 and 20% reduction in poverty headcount, respectively. Moreover, they also had a large impact on the improved Gini-coefficient in these places (World Bank, 2018).

However, within the large group of elderly people, there are many vulnerable people in poor circumstances. Elderly people living alone and in remote areas do not necessarily benefit from social protection programmes. For instance, while SAGE has increased the availability of formal credit facilities, most recipients are unable to use them because of their age, fragility or limited income base (Kuss & Gassmann, 2018).

On the other hand, designing programmes specifically targeted towards the elderly may cause overlap with other forms of social protection. This may create inequitable allocation and inefficient use of resources. Dorfman (2015) shows that elderly people seldom live alone in African countries. Social protection programmes targeted at poor households may, therefore, already reach elderly people. Also, if benefit levels are high and the eligibility age is close to or the same as the main social insurance, this can discourage labour force participation (World Bank, 2018).

#### 2.4.5 People in remote areas

As outlined above, people living in remote areas may face a double disadvantage: they are not always reached by social protection programmes and the multiplier effects of the transfers are likely to be lower in remote areas as compared to areas that are well connected to markets. This is mainly caused by a lack of infrastructure – the absence of (quality) roads, lack of mobile phone networks and few transport possibilities are some of the most important factors. As a result, economic benefits (such as income and labour) may lag behind. For instance, in the case of the SCG in Uganda, people in

remote areas face high costs in hiring labour, lack access to agricultural inputs and markets for selling produce, and do not increase their usage of mobile phones (Kuss & Gassmann, 2018). Moreover, in terms of multiplier effects, Kuss and Gassmann (2018) outline how new businesses in transport, mobile phone services, new and improved saving options, and agricultural inputs often emerge in integrated areas.

Although people in remote areas do benefit from social protection (such as the increase in informal savings groups identified by Kuss & Gassmann, 2018), investments in infrastructure can ensure multiplier effects in remote areas. Public works programmes may have more potential in this regard, specifically when implemented in remote areas. Rosas and Sabarwal (2016) found the public works programme in Sierra Leone to have a greater impact on employment status in rural areas with severely constrained households.

### 3. Cost effectiveness

The positive effect that social protection programmes can have on inclusive economic growth is clear. Yet, fully understanding how the costs and benefits of such interventions relate to one another and the complementary, and even substitution, effects of social protection and other policy options should be considered. As Jensen et al. (2017, p. 1) argue: “we must also take into account the opportunity cost of delivering funds from other potential programs that could also yield welfare gains” and assess the size of the negative impacts that not implementing social protection would have for households and communities. This analysis helps to determine if the costs of social protection are justified by their benefits.

Several studies have not only assessed the impacts of social protection programmes at the household level (see section 2.1) and community level (see section 2.2), or disaggregated them for vulnerable groups (see section 2.4), they have also compared these to the costs associated with social protection programmes. This is a challenging task on both sides: First, as outlined in the previous section, a large share of the benefits of social protection programmes are indirect, crystalizing throughout the years. Second, although programme costs can be expressed in money-metric terms, often as the sum of transfer costs and administrative costs, social protection programmes often involve hidden costs that arise from incentive effects or behavioural responses, such as the additional expenses incurred to make use of free health facilities or the impact of public works programmes on the division of intra-household labour. These costs are seldom fully visible, which makes a full assessment of the cost effectiveness of social protection programmes a challenging task. This section outlines the various studies done to compare the cost effectiveness of different types of programmes (section 3.1-3.2), the cost effectiveness of combined programmes (section 3.3-3.5) and the cost effectiveness when focusing on vulnerable groups (section 3.6).

#### **3.1 How cost effective are social protection interventions?**

The number of investigations comparing costs and benefits is limited. A collection of evaluations of cash transfers is shown in Table 3. According to Hodges et al. (2011; 2013), transfer programmes with complex targeting approaches have unfavourable cost-benefit ratios. This can be explained by them being recent, therefore, having large fixed start-up costs and not yet having achieved economies of scale (Handa et al., 2017). In their assessment of 14 programmes, Handa et al. (2017)

found that the cost-benefit ratio varies enormously depending on the age of the programme, the value of the transfer and the specific costs of the design of each programme. This is illustrated by Kardan et al. (2014), who show that for the CGP in Lesotho, 82% of the costs in the first 15 months of the programme were devoted to its start-up; while this decreased to 15% over a period of 5 years. In the long-term, the cost-benefit ratio decreased from 2.28 to 0.53, indicating that after several years the benefits outweigh the costs. Notably, Gupta et al. (2016), who also evaluated the CGP in Lesotho, found a similar cost-benefit ratio of 0.53, based on the benefits of the programme, measured as 42.1 million Lesotho loti, and costs of 22.4 million Lesotho loti.

Other examples of positive cost-benefit ratios include Ralston et al. (2017), who looked at transfers in Ghana, Liberia and Niger. They concluded that, on average, each USD 1 transferred increases household consumption by an additional USD 0.74. Filipski et al. (2016) concluded that, at the national level, the PSNP creates more than 1.7 Ethiopian birr per birr transferred. Taylor et al. (2013) found that the CT-OVC in the Eastern and Western regions of Kenya have high cost-benefit ratios: in the Eastern region, the 10.64 million Kenyan shilling transfers made at the baseline increased the total income in the region by 19.26 million Kenyan shillings. In the Western region, the 34.92 million Kenyan shilling transfers resulted in an increase of 46.79 million Kenyan shillings in income (Taylor et al., 2013). As shown in Table 3, among the various evaluations, the conclusion is that the benefits exceed the costs of national and local social protection programmes, with the exception of the graduation programme in Honduras studied by Banerjee et al. (2015a).

**Table 3. Costs and benefits of cash transfer programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa**


Intervention	Costs	Benefits	Source
CGP in Lesotho (in million Lesotho Loti)	22.4	42.1	Gupta et al., 2016
Graduation programmes (in USD PPP per household)			
- Ethiopia	4157	10805	Banerjee et al., 2015a
- Ghana	5408	7175	Banerjee et al., 2015a
- Honduras	3090	-6118	Banerjee et al., 2015a
- India	1107	6298	Banerjee et al., 2015a
- Pakistan	5962	10678	Banerjee et al., 2015a

- Peru	5742	8380	Banerjee et al., 2015a
PSNP in Ethiopia (as % of GDP in 2006)	1.37%	2.36%	Filipski et al., 2016
CT-OVC in Kenya (in million Kenyan shillings)			
- Western region	34.92	46.79	Taylor et al., 2013
- Eastern region	10.64	19.26	Taylor et al., 2013

Several factors turn cost-benefit analyses into complex activities. First, Gupta et al. (2016) point to the need for a thorough assessment of the full range of direct and indirect benefits of transfers. They calculate that out of the 42.1 million Lesotho loti in benefits, 14.59 million Lesotho loti accrues through indirect local spill over effects. Including the local spill over effect, the cost-benefit ratio turns out to be far more favourable than when only direct benefits are calculated.

Second, an assessment of the costs and benefits can seldom be done at a single moment. Many evaluations show that costs and benefits vary over time (c.f. Kardan et al., 2014; Davis et al., 2016; MoGLSD, 2016b). Hence, a cost-benefit analysis requires a long-term view. In their evaluation of the various interventions under SAGE, the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development in Uganda outlines the costs of universal health care and the Child Support Grant (CSG) for a period of 20 years. As shown in Figure 7, the costs of providing universal health care increase in the first five years up to 1.5% of GDP, but then decrease to a level of 0.9% of GDP in 2039.

**Figure 7. Cost of universal health care in Uganda**



Source: MoGLSD, 2016b

In contrast to universal programmes, targeted programmes can assess their target group through a cost-benefit analysis of various target groups and the size of transfers. The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development has compared the costs and benefits of providing the CSG under four scenarios. This is based on age group on the one hand (i.e. providing CSG to children up to 2 years of age or 8 years of age) and for high and low transfer amounts. Low benefits are 20% of the average expenditure, equivalent to 15,666 Ugandan shillings. High benefits are 30% of the average household expenditure, equivalent to 23,500 Ugandan shillings. Figures 8–11 show the cost estimates under the various scenarios. Several conclusions stand out:


- The costs for providing CSG to children up to 2 years (scenario 1) are substantially lower than providing CSG to children up to 8 years (scenario 2). Depending on low or high benefits, costs range from 0.3% to 1.0% annually for the first scenario, and 0.7% to 2.2% for the second scenario.
- The costs increase in the first years as part of the scaling up process. Under the first scenario, these costs peak in 2022, while for scenario 2 this takes place in 2032. Figures 8 and 9 show how costs decrease towards the level of costs at the beginning of implementation. As the costs in scenario 2 only reach their peak in 2032, costs may drop even further below 1.6% in 2039. This comparison shows that as part of the scaling up process, the size of the target group extends the period over which costs need to be assessed. In this case, it could be likely that under scenario 2 the costs drop to those in the first years of implementation, like for scenario 1.

We have concluded earlier that long-term benefits can be particularly high for children, as the returns by way of education and health, for instance, increase over time. Taking poverty reduction as the single objective, the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development conclude that providing CSG for children up to 2 years has a higher impact than providing CSG for children up to 8 years. For every 1% of GDP invested, the former can lead to up to 18% reduction in poverty, while the latter achieves 13% (MoGLSD, 2016b).


However, when the programme is not universal for children of the respective ages, but specifically targeted towards poor households, cost effectiveness increases. Providing the CSG to children up to

2 years, with low benefits and targeted at poor households is considered the most cost effective, with a poverty reduction rate of 33% per 1% GDP spent.

**Figure 81. Costs of CSG for children up to 2 years at low benefits as % of GDP**




**Figure 9. Costs of CSG for children up to 2 years at high benefits as % of GDP**




Source: MoGLSD, 2016b

**Figure 20. Costs of CSG for children up to 8 years at low benefits as % of GDP**



**Figure 31. Costs of CSG for children up to 8 years at high benefits as % of GDP**



Source: MoGLSD, 2016b

Evaluations also assessed the fiscal sustainability of UCTs. Under a ‘no expansion scenario’, Kardan et al. (2014) found that the cost of the CGP in Lesotho was 0.4% of total government expenditure (0.2% of GDP) in 2014/15. Further, the maximum costs of the programme are reached with full national

expansion, which is projected by 2020/21. Under this scenario the cost of the programme increases to 1.7% of total expenditure or 0.8% of GDP. Jesse et al. (2014) report that the total expenditure in Zambia for the social cash transfer programme was estimated at only 0.06% of GDP in 2013, the final year of the study. More recent estimates, based on the labour-constrained model (similar to Zambia's Multiple Category Targeting Grant reported on here) indicate a national expansion by 2021 of 1.8% of government expenditure and 0.4% of GDP (Kumitz & Pellerano, 2016). Ward et al. (2010) estimate that if the CT-OVC in Kenya covered all households with OVCs, the total programme expenditure would be 1.29% of GDP.

Earlier, Plavgo, De Milliano and Handa (2013) have attempted to simulate costs of national cash transfer programmes in other countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. They assume that a hypothetical programme would target the ultra-poor, scale up to 20% of the national population, pay an amount equivalent to 20% of household pre-intervention monthly consumption, and incur administration costs of 12%. According to this simulation, an UCT in 2012 would range from between 0.1 to 2% of GDP for most countries, with an overall average of 1.1% of GDP. Building on this simulation, Handa et al. conclude that "cash transfers at scale as a percentage of current spending and GDP are feasible and fully within the cost considerations of any national government" (Handa et al., 2017: p. 29).


### 3.2 Universal versus targeted programmes

The comparison of the cost effectiveness of different scenarios for an CSG in Uganda, outlined above, shows that a universal programme can have substantially different results than a targeted programme. However, what programmes are considered most cost effective depends on a range of factors. For each factor outlined below, we attempt to draw conclusions on the question under which conditions cost effectiveness would be optimized.

- **Range of benefits evaluated:** When only taking poverty reduction into account, targeting poor households slightly below the poverty gap can be considered the most cost-effective programme design, because of its high efficiency rate (see Figure 12). Yet, when taking other dimensions, such as the nutritious value of food, school attendance or psychological wellbeing, into account a very different picture emerges. For instance, if income generation is considered, a reduction in the hours worked may be considered an unfavourable outcome. Taking a broader perspective on wellbeing (i.e. acknowledging the importance of leisure time), the outcome could be considered positive. As concluded

by the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development of Uganda (MoGLSD, 2016b), a much different conclusion could be drawn about the cost effectiveness of providing support to children up to 8 years of age when the impact on physical and cognitive development is considered. The Ministry argues: “a longer-lasting grant at this stage of the life cycle positively affects educational attainment, because it supports the child in its early school years” (MoGLSD, 2016b, p. 78).

**Figure 12. Efficiency rates of providing CSG to children up to 2 year at low and high benefits**




Source: MoGLSD, 2016b

- **Hidden benefits and hidden costs:** Several benefits of targeted and universal programmes are not directly visible. This includes secondary and tertiary impacts and spillover effects to beyond research populations. For instance, recently, Haushofer and Shapiro (2018) expanded the debate on the impact of cash transfers by including the spillover effects to distant villages. Van de Walle (1998) argues that targeting poor households has the most hidden costs and benefits:
  - The hidden benefits include a wide range of economic and social benefits such as the leakage of the increased productivity of the poor, the change towards more equal intra-household dynamics, the long-term impacts of alleviating risk constraints, and the gains from receiving public support and losing dependency on rich elites.
  - The hidden costs include leakage to non-poor (inclusion errors) and the imperfect coverage of poor households (exclusion errors). Kidd et al. (2017) argue, for instance, that targeted programmes have larger inclusion and exclusion errors than universal programmes, increasing their relative costs (see Figure 13). Moreover, hidden costs

can often be opportunity costs: First, behavioural responses can result in additional costs, for example: the activities not undertaken as a result of participation in public works, reconfirmed social inequalities inside communities, and the ‘poverty trap’ (i.e. staying below the cut-off point for eligibility for a transfer). Second, there may be political economy costs to targeting the poor. Spending targeted at the poor instead of universal programmes, which benefit the middle class, may erode their support for poverty reduction. As outlined by Gelbach and Pritchett (2002), this can result in decreased expenditure on the poor in situations where the poor are marginalized. Even within communities, targeted programmes can be perceived as unfair and can lead to conflict or exclusion (see, for instance, Devereux et al., 2015a).

Figure 13. Efficiency rates of providing CSG to children up to 2 year at low and high benefits



Source: Kidd et al., 2017

- **Timeframe for evaluation:** As illustrated in the previous section, both benefits and costs may fluctuate over time. Often, estimations conclude that costs reduce over time, as most costs in the beginning are explained by starting up, scaling up and inefficiencies that can later be overcome through monitoring, evaluation and learning. Indirect benefits also take time to materialize (as shown in various studies, see sections 2.1 and 2.2), which indicates that long-term evaluation may paint a more positive picture than evaluations covering only the intervention timeframe.

- **Transfer size:** Evidently, higher transfers lead to higher costs and, generally, higher benefits. Finding the optimal size for transfers is a challenging, context-specific task. The previous section outlined how in Uganda, providing a CSG equivalent to 20% of average household consumption is more cost effective than the alternative of 30%. This assessment also depends on the group targeted. The same study found that for vulnerable groups the first scenario is only slightly favourable over the second, although this difference is larger for the full population. This can be explained by the fact that vulnerable households are severely constrained and require more assistance to move out of poverty. Handa et al. (2013, p. 7) conclude that “most successful cash transfer programmes transfer at least 20 percent of household consumption to beneficiaries”.
- **Welfare weights:** Assessments of poverty reduction can express this as the percentage of households (or the absolute number) of households lifted out of poverty. Yet, when particular weight is given to poverty reduction for a specific vulnerable groups (such as the extreme poor, women or people with disabilities), this can lead to different conclusions on cost effectiveness, often in favour of vulnerable groups. Section 3.6 will further outline the cost effectiveness of targeting vulnerable groups.

The analysis performed by the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development of Uganda (MoGLSD, 2016b) indicates that targeted programmes can more cost effectively reduce poverty than universal programmes. The most compelling recent evidence on cost-effective targeting comes from graduation programmes, combining various interventions for poor households. Banerjee et al. (2015a) conducted an experimental evaluation of the mid-term impacts of the graduation approach in six different sites across Africa, Latin-America and Asia. The programmes provided the sequenced dissemination of a social safety net transfer, a productive asset grant, training sessions, home visits, health information or services, and financial inclusion services. The first graduation programme was the Challenging the Frontiers of Poverty Reduction–Targeting the Ultra-Poor (CFPR-TUP) by the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC), which was designed after realizing that some of the ultra-poor (women in particular) were in such a marginalized position that they were unable to participate in the organization’s standard programmes (IPC-IG, 2017a).

The experiment found that graduation programmes improved the wellbeing of recipients in multiple dimensions. Increased consumption – the intervention’s primary goal – was achieved by the end of

the programme and maintained at the endline one year later. Three years after the productive assets had been transferred (and a year after the end of all interventions), eight of the ten measured indicators still showed a statistically significant increase. The programme's impact on key variables (household consumption, asset base and food security) showed very little or no decline over time. Banerjee et al. (2015a) also estimated the cost-benefit ratios for each experiment site, measuring costs as the sum of direct (direct transfers and supervision) and indirect (local and administrative overheads) costs, and benefits as the increase in recipient households' consumption. The programme was found to generate benefits that exceed its overall costs in six out of its seven locations, with the cost-benefit ratio ranging from 133% in Ghana to 433% in India. In Honduras, however, the programme's benefits were substantially lower than its costs, with an overall negative return of 198%.

Banerjee et al. (2015a) identify promising signs that impacts can last. In their experiment on graduation approach programmes, recipient households in Bangladesh were followed for a longer period than in the rest of the sites. At the end of the additional year, the positive impacts on assets, earnings and consumption were still persistent, neither had the effect on consumption declined in any of the experiment sites before the endline survey.

However, as argued by Kidd and Bailey-Athias (2017), several comments can be made about the conclusions by Banerjee et al. (2015a). First, although graduation programmes are indeed targeted towards the poor, many participating households had consumption levels higher than the commonly used poverty line of USD 1.25. In fact, in Peru and Pakistan, more than 80% of recipients had higher incomes. Second, although the results of the programmes are significant, Kidd and Bailey-Athias (2017) argue that the absolute results are not very large: earnings increased by USD 0.06 per day and per capita consumption increased by USD 0.04–0.12 per day. Third, as a result of disease, assets such as chickens were lost in Honduras and India. In the case of the former, this led beneficiaries to be poorer than at the baseline. This loss of assets appears to be highest among the poorest households. This can be explained by the various risks that poor households face, forcing them to sell assets. This points to a fourth comment: that the extreme poor benefited the least from graduation programmes. The increase in consumption was four times higher for the top 10% than for the bottom 10% in terms of household ante-programme income. This leads to the broader question of whether the ultra-poor can indeed graduate out of poverty at all within such a limited timeframe

(see, for instance, Daidone et al., 2015). Finally, although Banerjee et al. (2015a) conclude that the results are sustainable, their conclusions are drawn only one year after the programme ended. It is yet to be seen if the positive impacts of integrated programmes, such as those using the graduation approach, will persist in the long term. Robust answers to this question can only be generated if participants are followed for a longer time.

Misha et al. (2014) confirm several of these concerns in their evaluation of the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee programme implemented in 2002. They found mostly positive results of the entrepreneurship programme for those who were already entrepreneurs prior to the programme. In fact, the impacts on those who were not entrepreneurs appeared to dissipate over time: in 2005, the probability of engaging in entrepreneurship had increased by 9%, but fell to 4% in 2011. Simultaneously, assets (such as the ownership of cows) decreased between 2005 and 2011.

Moreover, the place of graduation programmes in countries' overall social protection systems, as well as the generalizability and transferability of the approach, has been subject to debate (IPC-IG, 2017a). To activate the economic potential of households in different socio-economic contexts, graduation programmes must adapt and evolve to address specific needs (Dharmadasa et al., 2017). In order to expand to urban populations, for example, there is a need for programmes to provide linkages to sustainable employment opportunities rather than self-employment and micro-enterprises, which are currently the focus of graduation approaches (De Montesquiou & Hashemi, 2017). Graduation programmes can contribute to, but should not aim to, replace social protection floors. As Samson (2015) warns, graduation programmes are no silver bullet, and while some people will be able to 'graduate' from extreme poverty and achieve productive livelihoods, others (the elderly, for instance) may require, and should receive, social assistance in the long term.

The effectiveness of either universal or targeted programmes depends on various design and implementation features. In fact, whether participants can indeed graduate out of poverty or not depends on the transfer size, regularity of payments and level of behaviour change communication, which is considered a key ingredient in the integrated graduation approach (c.f. Devereux et al., 2015b). Devereux et al. (2015b) and Kidd et al. (2017) report high inclusion and exclusion errors in categorically targeted programmes. Devereux et al. (2015b) report exclusion errors such as 23% in Nepal and 24% in Bangladesh. Like Kidd et al. (2017), they show that programmes can have inclusion

and exclusion errors at the same time, often having a rural exclusion error and an urban inclusion error. The impact of these inclusion and exclusion errors should not be underestimated, particularly within the conflict-sensitive contexts in many African countries. This points to an advantage of universalism, as argued by Grosh et al. (2008), “the social unity resulting from a uniform provision of benefits will garner a sufficient budget to provide meaningful protection”. Hence, Brown et al. (2018) conclude that the provision of basic incomes or transfers using simple demographic criteria often do better in reducing poverty than complex targeting methods.

Despite the many pitfalls associated with targeted approaches, some evaluations do point to their success. Apart from studies on graduation (c.f. Banerjee et al., 2015a; Daidone et al., 2015), Dorfman (2015) concludes that a targeted social pension can reduce national poverty with a rate almost twice as high as a universal approach, with targeting those above 65 years being more effective than targeting those above 60 years. Perhaps, a 20-year-old conclusion by Van de Walle still remains plausible: “the best approach may often be a combination of broad targeting of social sector and basic infrastructure spending with narrow targeting of transfers for neglected groups and objectives” (Van de Walle, 1998, p. 245).

### 3.3 Comparative studies

Within the scope of social assistance, it is possible to compare the cost effectiveness of different types of transfer modalities, between and within programmes. Cash has generally been found to be the least costly modality, compared to food vouchers and in-kind food transfers (Venton et al., 2015; Margolies & Hoddinot, 2014; Bailey and Pongracz, 2015; Pozarny, 2016), which is part of the rationale behind the increasing popularity of cash transfers in both emergency and non-emergency social protection settings. In-kind transfers have substantially higher administrative and delivery costs than cash (Gentilini, 2014; HLPE, 2012). Venton et al. (2015) reported that in Lebanon, electronic food vouchers have been more cost effective than cash transfers, predominantly because of lower start-up and operational costs. However, once hidden costs (including transaction costs for retailers, the reduction of competitors in the market, and increasing prices) were accounted for, cash was found to be more favourable in terms of efficiency (Venton, et al., 2015). Aker (2013) adds that UCTs can be efficient in reaching extremely vulnerable groups, even in failed states. However, this efficiency largely depends on access to markets for goods and services (Aker, 2013).

When measuring cost effectiveness, contextual factors and specific programme objectives are just as important as the associated administrative and delivery costs. Context, in particular the functioning of markets, should be considered when opting for one solution or another. As Gentilini (2014; 2016) argues, food distribution is appropriate when food markets are not functioning, but cash is likely to be the best choice under other circumstances. Programme objectives determine the outcome – the benefit – compared to the costs of the programme. Ahmed et al. (2016) discuss the difficulty of selecting a single most cost-effective transfer modality. In their comparative overview of four programmes in Bangladesh with different payment modalities (cash for work, food for work, food for assets, and an unconditional transfer of cash and food), they found it meaningless to pick a ‘best’ option, as cost efficiency varied depending on the type of outcome considered. For instance, in terms of increasing household income, the programmes providing either cash and food or cash only proved to be the most cost effective. If one looks at savings accumulation, however, cash for work has achieved the greatest value for money. In terms of targeting efficiency, food for assets performed the best. The differences can be explained by the different programme design features (such as the targeting mechanism, target group, and direct and indirect costs) and how they interact with the specific outcomes under investigation.

Sulaiman et al. (2016) compared the cost effectiveness of three different types of social protection interventions: lump-sum unconditional cash transfers, livelihood development programmes and the graduation approach. This comparative meta-analysis of 48 different programmes measured annual household consumption or income as a proportion of overall programme costs and found that lump-sum cash transfers had the largest immediate impact-cost ratio. This was followed by livelihood and graduation programmes. Yet, lump-sum cash transfers did not produce significant long-lasting impacts, and graduation programmes registered higher cost effectiveness in the long term than livelihood programmes (Sulaiman et al., 2016).

Akresh et al. (2016) compared the cost-effectiveness of CCTs and UCTs in rural Burkina Faso. Overall, CCTs appear to be more cost-effective than UCTs for all indicators of education, health and household welfare except child illness. While it is often believed that UCTs are preferable over CCTs in settings with little administrative capacity, this study proves that CCTs can be manageable and not too costly in such a setting in Burkina Faso (Akresh et al., 2016).

Under the RIDSSA programme, seven research groups compared different elements of cost effectiveness of various existing programmes. Merten (2018) compared the cost effectiveness of using maternal vouchers with the Free Maternal Services (FMS) in Kenya for four types of services: antenatal services, normal delivery services, complicated delivery services and post-natal services. In the case of normal delivery services, the maternity voucher scheme is considered most cost effective, while the FMS appears more cost effective for the other three services. However, Merten argues that the fact that the voucher targets more vulnerable mothers should be taken into account. Moreover, she concludes that for both antenatal and post-natal services, the voucher programme can be less costly than the FMS in the long term, because only vulnerable mothers are targeted.

Several contextual factors influence this cost effectiveness assessment. In terms of the quality of services, due to perceived lower quality of services in public facilities compared to private ones, vouchers were preferred. Furthermore, the FMS has hidden costs. Mothers still incur some expenses in the free maternity service facilities, which makes poor mothers sell assets (livestock or land), borrow or seek assistance from relatives (Merten, 2018).

Wong et al. (forthcoming) compared the addition of WII and AICs to the PSNP in Ethiopia. The former provides farmers with compensation when rainfall drops below a minimum level. The AIC is a voucher that has to be exchanged for agricultural inputs. One group of farmers received 400 Ethiopian birr of AICs only, while a second group received 200 Ethiopian birr of AICs and subsidized insurance to the value of 300 Ethiopian birr. Both were provided on top of the transfers received under the PSNP. Wong et al. (forthcoming) conclude that in terms of the total value of inputs purchased, providing the AICs resulted in significantly more inputs being purchased than providing the AICs and WII. Moreover, they found that participation in the WII quickly dropped if subsidies were dropped and farmers had to make own contributions (see Table A7 in Annex 1).

The authors found very few significant impacts of WII, in contrast to other studies (c.f. Karlan et al, 2014). They explain this by the fact that the farmers studied are severely cash/credit constrained, more than risk constrained. Hence, relieving these constraints by providing AICs has a larger impact than relieving risk constraints. This study outlines that a careful assessment of the socio-economic conditions of farmers needs to be done before deciding upon one of the interventions over the other. Moreover, the lack of impact of agricultural production may be explained by the nature of the

insurance: farmers are insured against droughts, rather than crop failure. This may take away incentives for production in periods of low rainfall (Wong et al., forthcoming).

### 3.4 Complementarity

#### 3.4.1 With other social protection programmes

One of the questions of the INCLUDE research agenda on social protection is to what extent complementarities between the various social protection interventions exist. If the interaction effect between multiple interventions is positive, this indicates that investing in an integrated programme, or combining interventions, is most cost effective.

So far, only a few studies have empirically tested the interaction effects between social protection interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Jensen et al. (2015) found no complementarity between the Hunger Safety Net Programme and the index-based livestock insurance in Kenya. The evaluation of the joint effect of the national PSNP and a community-based nutrition programme also found no interaction effects (Berhane et al., 2014). Studies that do find significant impacts point to the complementarity (i.e. the positive interaction effect) of interventions. Berhane et al. (2011) argue that the investments made under the PSNP or OFSP/HABP are to a large extent conditional: they depend on the access of households to the other scheme. This complementarity can be explained by the nature of the two schemes: the OFSP/HABP provides technical assistance while the PSNP provides financial resources that can be used for investment. They conclude that having access to both programmes reduced the length of the last hungry season by 1.5 months per year and increased livestock holdings by 0.99 tropical livestock units (Berhane et al., 2011). In their joint evaluation of the Social Cash Transfer Programme and FISP in Malawi, Daidone et al. (2017) found that the joint impact of the programmes on total expenditure and value of production are 15% and 22% larger, respectively, than the sum of the stand-alone impacts.

Pouw et al. (2017) compared the separate and joint effects of LEAP and the NHIS for the full research population, but also for poor households and extremely poor households within the sample. The results are presented in Table A6 in Annex 1. Significant interaction effects between LEAP and the NHIS were found for all variables, except for worker status, and for all of the three groups studied. This points to the potential multiplier effects that social protection policies can have on indicators of food security, (child) health and land tenure. However, although these effects are

significant, most of the times the effects lie in between the separate effects of LEAP and the NHIS. In fact, the interaction effect is often positive, but most of the times smaller than the sum of the separate effects of the two programmes. The only exception is weight-for-age, for which the interaction effect was higher than the sum of the separate effects.

The results indicate that although interaction effects exist, they are mostly substitutive effects rather than complementary effects. Participants who received the cash transfer in LEAP and were also waived from health costs through the NHIS may be able to spend more on goods and services, which were unavailable to them through the programmes alone. This indicates that multiplier effects are largely absent (weight-for-age for children being the exception). As a result, there is no evidence for the hypothesis that investing in the two interventions simultaneously yields better benefits than investing in them separately.

More research on the complementarity of social protection programmes could help inform policymakers as to whether to focus support on an integrated programme or invest in social protection in more locations. This research needs to take into account the explanatory factors for different types of interaction effects (complementary or substitutive), such as the effectiveness of coordination and implementation (discussed further in chapter 4).

### **3.4.2 With other social policies**

Several studies outline the importance of other social services in the effectiveness of social protection programmes. For instance, Elbers et al. (2018) and Merten (2018) point to the quality of public health services in relation to the cost effectiveness of maternal health services. Merten concludes that the cost effectiveness of the FMS relative to maternity vouchers could be higher if the quality of these services improved.

These conclusions show the potential complementarity that social protection interventions and other social policies could have. By easing the budget constraints of households, cash transfers can effectively improve a range of indicators related to human wellbeing, including food security, health, education, productivity, social capital, and social mobility. Recent studies, however, show that cash transfers alone have limited ability to address the structural and behavioural barriers that prohibit poor or marginalized populations from enhancing their capabilities (Roelen et al., 2017; Bastagli et

al., 2016). These phenomena are closely related to the sources of heterogeneity discussed in section 2.3 of this review. Complementing cash transfers with additional interventions specifically aimed at these structural factors has gained increased attention in the social protection agendas both developing and developed countries. These complementarities are most commonly referred to as 'Cash+' in the contemporary discourse (Roelen et al., 2017), and can address supply or demand-side barriers. Graduation programmes are the most common example of these Cash+ programmes.

Complementarities and linkages to other types of support are increasingly used to enhance a wide array of development outcomes, such as health, nutrition, education, good parenting, employability and even reduced criminality, just to name a few. In an overview of social protection programmes aimed at reducing youth vulnerability in Sub-Saharan African countries, Watson and Palermo (2016) observed that combined interventions of financial support and interventions promoting social or human capital are more effective than either type of support alone. A recent study has investigated the complementarity effects of social protection transfers and counselling provided to Northern Ugandan women experiencing post-traumatic stress disorder (Van Reisen et al., 2018). The combination of cash and counselling did have the highest overall impact on recipients' expectation of income, albeit the complementarity effect was small and insignificant. Tirivayi and Groot (2018) found that integrating food assistance in AIDS treatment and care programmes creates disincentives for labour participation. It reduced participants' hours worked by up to 54%, transitions to employment by up to 70% and the labour market participation rates of male patients by 72%. However, this reduction is compensated for by the increased labour supply by other household members.

Blattman et al. (2017) experimented with providing cash transfers, cognitive behaviour therapy, or a combination of both to Liberian men identified as being engaged in criminal activities. While all of the interventions brought about a decrease in criminal activity in the short term, the effects of providing either cash or therapy alone dissipated over time. A combined provision of cash and therapy, however, showed lasting impacts on criminality, even a year after the end of the intervention (Blattman, et al., 2017). The evidence on the impact of cash transfers on child nutrition has been notoriously mixed (Bastagli et al., 2016; De Groot et al., 2017). In search of the type of support, or combinations of support, that can unleash the most positive changes in this domain, Ahmed et al. (2016) conducted a comparative evaluation of five programming options in Bangladesh:

only cash, only food, cash and food, cash plus nutrition behaviour change communication, and food plus nutrition behaviour change communication. Out of the five trials, only the combination of cash and nutrition behaviour change communication was able to achieve significant improvements in child malnutrition (Ahmed et al., 2016). Berhane et al. (2014; 2011) found that a combination of a paid public works programme (the PSNP) and a community food security programme achieved larger positive impacts on household food security than participating in either of the programmes alone (a reduction of food insecurity by 1.5 months a year compared to 0.6 months for the PSNP alone).

Several programmes around the globe have experimented with creating synergies between health care and social protection, in the form of supply and demand-side interventions. In Ghana, the LEAP programme combines cash transfers with the free provision of health insurance. As a result, 90% of households receiving LEAP transfers are enrolled in the NHIS, and the transfer has allowed households to pay for treatment and medication for their members (Davis et al., 2014). Shigute et al. (2017) compared various health and livelihood indicators among people participating in the PSNP and/or enrolled in the Community Based Health Insurance scheme in Ethiopia. The outcomes were highest across all indicators for those who participated in both programmes, with observed increases in livestock ownership, participation in off-farm labour, and the use of outpatient care and a decline in debt holding. Benefiting from both interventions (as opposed to neither) is associated with a 5% higher likelihood of utilizing outpatient care and 21% higher likelihood of engaging in off-farm livelihood activities. Hirvonen et al. (2017) and Shigute et al. (2017) call for better coordination between the PSNP and health insurance policies in Ethiopia to harvest the potential combined benefits. Merten (2018) suggests a number of complementary policies to improve social maternal health programmes in Kenya: First, the improvement of the quality of public health care services to improve the utilization and quality of Free Maternity Services; second, maternity vouchers with cost exemptions for the very poor to improve the maternity voucher scheme; and, third, human resource development for health workers and information dissemination to mothers, particularly those from the poorest quintile, to improve access to and the quality of services.

Agriculture and livestock play important roles in the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa and, therefore, creating synergies between social protection and the agricultural sector is a sensible decision in order to strengthen productive outcomes. Pace et al. (2017) have estimated the complementarities between a cash transfer and the Farm Input Subsidy Programme in Malawi, which were not

deliberately linked to one another, but existed in parallel. The paper argues that participating in both programmes simultaneously raises the cost-benefit ratio of programmes by increasing expenditure and the value of agricultural and livestock production, more so than the individual interventions (Pace et al., 2017). Hoddinott et al. (2012) found that participation in both the PSNP and OFSP/HABP in Ethiopia led to improvements in the use of agricultural inputs, while the PSNP alone led to no significant improvements. Despite the rationale for coordination between agriculture and social protection, Slater et al. (2016) mention that there is still a long way to go and several challenges to face before this will become a reality in the six countries they studied. In their review of the relevant literature, Veras Soares et al. (2017) note that most of the evidence on the synergies between agricultural and social protection programmes fails to show whether the combined impacts are higher than the sum of individual programme impacts. They argue for more research on the spillover effects of both types of programmes (including on non-eligible households), the joint impact of programmes at the community level, and the impact of food-based social protection programmes such as school feeding.

Wong et al. (C forthcoming) did not find interaction effects between WII and the PSNP, but this was not part of their research design. Hence, this interaction needs to be further investigated, particularly the relation between the non-contributory PSNP and the (partly) contributory WII. The low participation rates under lower rates of subsidies may be (partly) explained by the participation of farmers in non-contributory programmes such as the cash transfers under the PSNP.

The studies outlined above show that the cost effectiveness of combining social protection with other social policies is highly context specific. The complementarity found in the various evaluations shows that it is probably more cost effective to invest in both social protection programmes and other policies simultaneously, rather than seeing them as substitutes for each other. There is an additional advantage of linking social protection with other social policies. The development of clear exit and graduation mechanisms to enable beneficiaries wean themselves off social assistance programmes and become financially self-sufficient or, whenever possible, graduate into other social protection interventions is essential for a sustained impact. This can be achieved by linking social protection programmes to poverty reduction mechanisms and incorporating productive components in cash transfers.

### 3.5 Substitution effects

So far, the academic literature has paid little attention to how social protection can substitute (or be substituted by) other policies. The only identified study that has taken a direct comparative approach measures the risk and vulnerability reduction effect of cash transfers versus insurance (Jensen et al., 2017). While cushioning against shocks is not the sole objective of social protection, it is indeed one of the functions of cash transfers and other risk-responsive/resilience-building safety nets. When shocks occur, households might resort to adverse coping strategies that are inherently harmful to intermediate growth objectives. Jensen et al. (2017) have conducted a comparative evaluation of unconditional cash transfers (the Hunger Safety Net Programme) and index insurance (Index-Based Livestock Insurance) among pastoral communities in the arid lands of rural Kenya. At their current scale, the two interventions have been comparably cost effective. However, the marginal cost-benefit ratio of the index insurance significantly exceeds that of the Hunger Safety Net Programme – making it a more cost-effective choice if scaled up.

This approach of direct comparison might, however, be problematic if one considers the objectives of the two programmes. The Hunger Safety Net Programme, being a targeted social assistance scheme, aims to promote equity by protecting recipients from poverty and destitution. The index insurance, on the other hand, contributes to the objective of resilience. An index insurance and a basic social safety net are not alternatives; as Binswanger-Mkhize (2012) argues, such commercial products are unlikely to benefit the poorest segments of the population, even if they do provide considerable support to the ones who receive them. Moreover, Leblois et al. (2014) point out that when using index-based insurance, insured farmers almost always have to face a considerable basis risk – meaning that they are not adequately cushioned against shocks, despite being insured.

Some authors argue that the main constraint the poor face in securing their livelihoods is lack of access to financial products (such as credit and insurance), and that insurance products and capital transfers can effectively help grow their microenterprises and, thus, incomes (Fafchamps et al., 2014; Blattman et al., 2014). However, most of the evidence on this topic is generated from studies that look at people who either already own a business or who have been selected on the base of their business aptitude – creating a selection bias in favour of the better-off. Blattman et al. (2014) use a field experiment to study a microenterprise support programme for ultra-poor rural women in Northern Uganda to see whether such findings apply to marginalized groups of the population. This

programme combines a five-day business skill training, a lump-sum transfer of USD 150 cash (to be spent on launching the microenterprise), regular supervision and encouragement to form a support group – all of which aim to create opportunities for recipient women. This package of interventions led to a significant rise in incomes and a doubling of non-farm enterprises in the target population. When isolating the effects of self-help group formulation, the study found that the element was enough to boost incomes, signalling the importance of social capital in addressing marginalization. For the complete programme, the authors found a rate of return of 24%, concluding that the programme does in fact provide cost-effective support for ultra-poor, marginalized women. However, impacts in the medium or long term are not documented. In a similar experiment in Ethiopia, Blattman and Dercon (2017) compare an entrepreneurship programme with an industrial job offer and conclude that the business programme is more effective in raising incomes while the industrial work involves a low wage and risky work conditions, but provides more and stable working hours and can be preferred to deal with temporary unemployment and shocks.

Insurance programmes are policy interventions at the margins of social protection, which are frequently used to promote the resilience of a population depending on agriculture or livestock for their livelihoods (Barooah et al., 2017). In a scoping study on the efficacy and effectiveness of financial agricultural risk management (FARM) products for agricultural smallholders, Barooah et al. (2017) identified a number of knowledge gaps in the state of the art literature. Perhaps most relevant to the relationship between alternative policy options and social protection is the fact that there is very little known about the welfare effects of FARM products. While there is substantial evidence on positive short-term impacts, the authors argue, that the mid and long-term impacts on farmers' wellbeing, productivity and investment decisions are not yet adequately evaluated. It is, therefore, difficult to draw conclusions on the ability of FARM programmes to contribute to equity, resilience and opportunity in a sustainable manner. Stoeffler et al. (2016) measured the impact of insurance products on cotton farmers' income and livelihoods in Burkina Faso and found a significant and positive effect on several productive activities. Elabed and Carter (2014) conducted an experiment offering micro-insurance to cotton farmers in Mali and found significant positive effects of intention to provide insurance<sup>6</sup> on production and livelihoods. Offering insurance was associated with a 15% increase in the area of cotton production and a 15% increase in expenditure on seeds.

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<sup>6</sup> The study randomly offered cotton farming cooperatives the opportunity to take out discounted micro-insurance and measured the impacts (of what they called the 'intention to treat'), compared to members of cooperatives who were not offered this opportunity.

Those farmers who did take out insurance increased their crop area by 75%, which the authors attribute to an increased feeling of security. Jensen et al. (2015) evaluated Index-Based Livestock Insurance in Ethiopia and Kenya and found the insurance to be a valuable mechanism in reducing dependence on livestock, devastation from droughts and overcoming the absence of inclusive formal mechanisms to protect pastoralists from shocks. Karlan et al. (2014) found significant impacts of index insurance on the investments of maize producers in Ghana, with insured farmers increasing their cultivated area by 15% and use of inputs by 40%. The significant and positive impacts of insurance on the investment behaviour of farmers found by Jensen et al. (2015) and Karlan et al. (2014) suggest that risk is a major driver of underinvestment in smallholder agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa. The evidence so far suggests that insurance products can be promising ways to strengthen the resilience of agricultural and pastoral communities, but it must be noted that these interventions cannot protect the poorest of the poor, who do not have productive assets to insure. In fact, as shown by Wong et al. (C forthcoming), these extreme poor are heavily cash/credit constrained and, therefore, would benefit more from alleviating these constraints than alleviating their risk constraints.

Regarding the effectiveness of health insurances, Elbers et al. (C 2018) conclude that the introduction of FMS-FPC may have decreased (re-)enrolment in the contributory insurance of the Tanykina Community in Kenya. The dropout rates were high throughout the whole programme period. However, while dropouts increased and enrolments decreased, the percentage of facility deliveries increased significantly from 36.6% in 2011 to 61.9% in 2014 (C Elbers et al., 2018). It appears that free health services substituted for the contributory insurance. Hence, the introduction of insurance should be well aligned, and perhaps rejected, when other non-contributory social policies function as a substitute.

Microcredit has been a trending topic among development practitioners since the early 2000s, stemming from the notion of credit constraints being the key obstacle the poor face in transforming their lives. Much of the evidence, however, has been “based on anecdotes, descriptive statistics, and impact studies that failed to disentangle causation from correlation” (Banerjee et al., 2015b, p.2). Banerjee et al. (2015a) synthesized the findings of six randomized controlled trials of microcredit, all of which found at least some evidence that business activity is positively affected by access to the microcredit service. However, while four of the six studies found a positive correlation between total


household income and microcredit, the relationship was not statistically significant. Evaluations that follow participating households for a longer period of time are, however, missing, making it difficult to draw conclusions on the long-term effects of microcredit (Banerjee et al., 2015a).

In conclusion, while the evidence base has been growing rapidly since 2014, it is difficult to draw direct and definitive conclusions, as the evaluations refer to heterogeneous programme compositions (and even heterogeneous design features within programme elements), measure varying indicators, and are in most cases context specific. However, there are some promising signs that not only simple cash transfers, but also more complex programming options can yield both long-lasting results and remain affordable (c.f. Hodges et al., 2011; 2013).

### 3.6 Cost effectiveness for vulnerable groups

Various studies reveal different impacts for the full population of the intervention and vulnerable groups such as the extreme poor. Section 2.4 already outlined how vulnerable groups may not benefit from social protection in the same way as other groups, due to various forms of exclusion. The study performed by the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MoGLSD, 2016b) in Uganda is one of the many examples that targeting vulnerable groups has a lower cost-benefit ratio than other groups (see Figure 14). This is due to the many constraints identified earlier. Integrated programmes are required to reduce these constraints and optimize the effectiveness of efforts to improve the wellbeing of these vulnerable groups.

**Figure 44. Reduction in poverty gap for every 1% of GDP spent**




Source: MoGLSD, 2016b

The concept of ‘welfare weights’, discussed earlier in this report, implies that cost-effectiveness assessments can have different outcomes when the impact on vulnerable groups is considered to be of higher value. Dietrich et al. (2017a) argue that transfers and the subsequent welfare outcomes of the poor should receive a larger weight in any evaluation than those of the better off. They argue that the returns on a unit transferred to a poor individual are higher for society than a unit transferred to someone higher up on the income distribution ladder.

Using these welfare weights, Dietrich and Gassmann (2018) found that the rate of return in terms of education for the VFSG and SCG under SAGE in Uganda improved. Simulating the rate of return for a period of 10 years after introduction of the programme, they found negative cost-benefit ratios for both programmes (see Figure 15). Yet, when redistribution towards the poorest households is considered as a welfare weight, the rate of return of the SCG becomes positive. The rate of return for the VFSG is negative under all redistribution preferences.

**Figure 15. Rate of return for VFSG and SCG in Uganda after 10 years, by preference for redistribution**



Source: Dietrich & Gassmann, 2018

Performing a complete cost effectiveness simulation for the long term is a challenging task, given the many scenarios under which indirect benefits can develop. Yet, Gupta et al. (2016) show the


importance of considering these indirect benefits in future projections, as they found that 34.7% of the benefits are spillover effects.

Targeting vulnerable groups is generally less cost efficient than other methods of targeting (or universal programmes). Only when welfare weights are used in the evaluation does the cost-benefit ratio of targeting vulnerable groups improve. Assuming that welfare weights are not being used, this indicates a trilemma for programmes providing social protection to vulnerable groups (as shown in Figure 16): targeting vulnerable groups often involves high costs and low cost efficiency. Countries with low budgets for social protection are probably unable to allocate budgets to these targeted programmes while providing universal social protection at the same time. The trilemma implicates that out of the three objectives, only two can be achieved at the same time.

- When universal programmes and targeted programmes (towards vulnerable groups) are implemented, this comes with high costs, which are often unable to be borne by national governments.
- When universal programmes are implemented in a cost-effective way, this probably excludes the option of targeting vulnerable groups, as targeting them is not as cost effective as universal programmes.
- When targeted programmes are implemented with high costs, and cost-effective budgeting is an objective of national governments, this probably leaves no space for universal programmes.

This trilemma is, of course, an exaggeration of the choices open to policymakers. Moreover, the trilemma is not necessarily supported by evidence. Yet, the various assessments of cost effectiveness outlined in this section show that choosing the most desirable (set of) intervention(s) is more often a political issue than an issue of evidence. Policymakers have to prioritize their objectives in implementing social protection and choose the right instruments accordingly. This section has helped to provide a menu of options that policymakers can choose from, highlighting the importance of context in many evaluations performed.

**Figure 16. The trilemma of providing social protection to vulnerable groups**



## 4. Coordination and implementation

Many impact evaluations of social protection programmes point to the importance of design and implementation as determining factor in their outcome. While the previous chapter has outlined the cost effectiveness of various types of programmes, this chapter outlines under which conditions (i.e. coordination and implementation) the cost effectiveness of social protection can be improved. Special attention is paid to the alignment between formal and informal social protection programmes and creating a strategic context for the introduction or upscaling of social protection schemes. This chapter draws particularly on insights gained at various meetings hosted by INCLUDE, particularly the African Policy Dialogues, the conference [‘Social protection for inclusive growth in Africa’](#), co-hosted with the Economic Policy and Research Centre on 21 June 2018 in Kampala, and the seminar [‘Leaving no one behind through social protection’](#), co-hosted with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and UNICEF on 29 October 2016 in The Hague.

### 4.1 Increasing cost effectiveness


The wide range of evaluations performed outline the various contextual factors that could improve the cost effectiveness of social protection programmes. Many factors involve effective coordination and implementation, particularly when targeted towards vulnerable groups. Cost effectiveness can be enhanced by improving the coordination and implementation of the programme, as outlined in this section.

**4.1.1 Budget allocation**

Although social protection is on the rise in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the budgets devoted to social safety nets (as % of GDP) are the highest after Europe and Central Asia, many countries still face inadequate financing of social protection to cover the huge demand. Moreover, between country differences are high. In Uganda, for instance, expenditure on social protection initiatives has been low, at 0.1% of GDP, compared to neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia at 0.3% and 0.7% of GDP, respectively. Notably, local government allocation to social development (social grants) has declined over time (from a projected 10% in 2014/15, 7.9% in 2015/16, 3.7% in 2016/17, and 3.6% in 2017/18). On the other hand, the budget devoted to direct income support has almost doubled over five years (see Table A8 in Annex 1). In Kenya, coverage of the National Social Safety Net, which consists of the Older Persons Cash Transfer, CT-OVC, Cash Transfer for Persons with Severe Disabilities and Hunger Safety Net Programme, is increasing (see Figure 17). Yet, still, most vulnerable households are yet to be reached.

As concluded in the INCLUDE conference ‘[Social protection for inclusive growth in Africa](#)’, expanding the tax revenue base of national governments is vital in overcoming budget deficits. This can also help to overcome the fear of dependency on donor funds and make social protection financially sustainable. Attention needs to be paid to increasing tax revenue from the informal economy.

**Figure 17. Coverage of social protection schemes in Kenya**



Source: AIHD, 2017

#### 4.1.2 Smooth delivery of transfers and information

As discussed in Box 2 (see section 2.1.10), providing long-term, regular and predictable transfers can improve the impact of cash transfers. Yet, there are many pitfalls in the delivery of social protection that can be avoided. For instance, Pouw et al. (2017) conclude that the impact of LEAP is likely to be undermined by the irregularity of payments and the relatively small transfers in the early years of the programme. This is confirmed by Handa et al. (2013), who outline that in a 24-month evaluation period households received only 20 months' worth of payments, mainly as a result of highly irregular payments. Approximately half of the survey respondents in Fre's (2018) study indicated that transfers were not made on time, which forced many of them to sell household assets or cattle to meet food needs. Hoddinott et al. (2015) argues that this is a geographical issue as well: in lowland areas in Ethiopia, public works beneficiaries do not receive their complete entitlement. On average, public works beneficiaries receive 52.4% of their entitlement in Afar and 73.5% in Somali. These issues are often related to the infancy of programmes and can decrease over time. Berhane et al. (2013) argue, for instance, that the predictability of payments and access to public works have become more consistent over time.

The small outreach to the extreme poor is also a consequence of targeting errors (Pouw et al., 2017). Challenges with the targeting of beneficiaries exist in various programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa. Targeting is prone to errors and progressive realization has resulted in vulnerable cases deserving coverage (enrolment) to fall through the cracks and further into poverty. In addition to the discussion on universal and targeted programmes (see section 3.1.1), targeting mechanisms are often expensive and depend on the capacity of local governments and political will of local bureaucrats (Rohregger et al., 2017). Universal programmes also face the issue of lack of coverage. In several of INCLUDE's meetings, the importance of single registries for the provision of social protection was, therefore, underlined. These can make implementation more efficient and reduce inclusion and exclusion errors. In Kenya, a single registry was introduced in 2016. Yet, so far, only the national social protection programmes and one non-governmental programme have subscribed to the registry.

A key factor in imperfect participation in social protection schemes is the lack of quality information provided to households. Particularly in health services, access to various types of information (i.e. how to use the transfer, criteria for eligibility, etc.) is essential (Merten, 2018; Pouw et al.,

2017). Pouw et al. (C 2017) argue that improved information on the NHIS could also increase complementarity between LEAP and the NHIS. This conclusion is supported by Elbers et al., who conclude that the “smooth implementation of new policies asks for timely and sufficient information [for households accessing health facilities, red.] and funding flows in order for programme managers to run their programmes effectively” (C Elbers et al. 2018, p. 4). Wong et al. (C forthcoming) illustrate the importance of information provision in social protection schemes that are new to local populations. They conclude that the knowledge that farmers possess about insurance plays an important role in the participation of farmers. The implementation of the scheme included providing trainings to farmers on access to, and the conditions of, the insurance. Farmers’ general knowledge of the insurance was considered good, but their technical knowledge of the insurance was limited. It is uncertain if improved knowledge would have improved participation. In fact, more knowledge may stimulate strategic behaviour and induce moral hazard.

Finally, it appears that the issue of high transaction costs applies, particularly to the (extreme) poor. These costs include registration, transportation to delivery facilities and other administrative requirements that the (extreme) poor often cannot meet. As a result, many of the extreme poor under LEAP do not benefit from the NHIS, in which only 18% of the extreme poor are registered. Merten (C2018) concludes that a lack of commitment and synergy between key stakeholders and institutional challenges in the targeting of maternal health programmes means that the voucher scheme does not reach the very poor. Transaction costs for the (extreme) poor can be reduced either through general reductions in transaction costs (e.g. lower costs of registration) or additional support to poor households (e.g. expanding delivery to remote areas).

#### **4.1.3 Vertical governance**

The implementation of national social protection schemes depends on coordination between government bodies and implementing institutions at various levels. In Kenya, implementation of the CT-OVC occurs in the context of decentralization, following the new constitution adopted by Kenya in 2010. Part of this decentralization was the replacement of 8 provinces by 47 elected county governments. The INCLUDE African Policy Dialogues have shown how, despite the existence of various national and sub-national programmes, legal measures to establish clear roles and responsibilities between the different levels of government are not yet in place. Similar conclusions have been drawn in the APD in Uganda.

Weak governance not only hinders the coverage and quality of social protection services. It can also reduce the accountability and transparency of implementation. This is related to weak structures for the monitoring and evaluation of policies, action plans and strategies, partly due to the limited resources allocated to these functions. Accountability is largely upwards towards government ministry officials and the effectiveness of programmes has not been informed by prudent consideration of service delivery. This in turn explains challenges like delayed disbursement and ‘double dipping’ (i.e. beneficiaries benefiting from more than one programme, while others who are deserving miss out).

The CT-OVC coordination and implementation are performed at the national level in Kenya by the Department of Children’s Services. Yet, tasks such as supervision, management, reporting and training are performed at the county, sub-county or community level. In various ways, the local, informal political economy determines the effective coordination and implementation of the CT-OVC: “despite the fact that they do not have a formal function in the implementation of the CT-OVC, chiefs, sub-chiefs and community elders are routinely at the centre stage of implementation processes playing a key role regarding all major operational functions” (Rohregger et al., 2017, p. 11). Despite not being part of the formal operational structure of the programme, these local traditional leaders are often consulted by bureaucrats for the implementation of the CT-OVC. Stakeholders have indicated that targeting mechanisms favour the family members, kinsmen and other relatives of these traditional leaders. This is confirmed by Dekker’s study (2004) on the influence of social networks (including kin relationships) on social security in rural Zimbabwe.

Despite this interfering role, stakeholders indicate that the traditional authorities also play a positive, complementary role in the targeting of the poor. For instance, sub-chiefs from remote areas are often able to have vulnerable people from these areas included in the CT-OVC. Moreover, chiefs play an important role in disseminating information, data collection processes (such as the provision of telephone numbers), counselling in the context of grievances and complaints, and organizing community meetings (*barazas*). The communicative role can be explained by the high level of bureaucracy in the formal system: officers complained about slow and irresponsive communication structures, where data needs to be verified or accessed at the central level. Instead, local bureaucrats develop their own communication structures and networks (Rohregger et al., 2017).

Using the framework of Helmke and Levitsky (2014) on the four roles that informal institutions can play, Rohregger et al. (C 2017) conclude that the traditional authorities fulfil all four types of roles: they complement, substitute, accommodate and compete with formal institutions. This gives them an ambivalent role: they simultaneously provide support, alternatives and interference to the implementation of the CT-OVC. However, local authorities seem essential in the implementation and coordination processes for geographical, financial and technical reasons.

The differences between regions in the importance of informal institutions can shed light on how to optimize the advantages and disadvantages of traditional authorities. Rohregger et al. (C 2017) concluded that three factors influence the impact of these authorities. First, these authorities are more important in rural areas, hence, the dynamics mentioned above are more in play in rural areas. Second, time and learning processes are important: formal institutions are better able to overcome the interfering effects of ineffective informal institutions in settings where the CT-OVC has been in place for a long time and where formal rules and regulations are functioning. Finally, the devolution under the new constitution plays an important role –as a result, counties have started to develop and implement their own social protection policies and programmes, alongside existing national programmes. One such example is the Old Peoples Cash Transfer in Boma County. Although this devolution is seen as an improvement of the social support at the county level, government representatives mention the issue of duplication and fragmentation, including ‘double dipping’.

#### **4.1.4 Community participation and context specificity**

As discussed in section 2.2.3, social cohesion is important (both as a means and an end) in social protection programmes. As targeted programmes can induce conflict (see section 3.2), the participation of local communities is vital in ensuring the efficient implementation of programmes. Yet, often these processes are not facilitated. Merten (C 2018) argues that low community participation was one of the main factors that contributed to not reaching the poor in Kenya. Similarly, Fre (C 2018) concludes that the most important challenge in the implementation of the PSNP in the Afar region was the issue of community participation in the planning, implementation and evaluation of the programme itself.

In the case of the PSNP, this contributed to a lack of contextualization of the PSNP to the geographic and socio-cultural settings in the Afar (for instance, the adaptation to seasonal circumstances and pastoralists agricultural schemes). Fre (C 2018) concludes that the PSNP was implemented as a standardized intervention that is not tailored to the Afar community's livelihood systems, culture and priorities. This includes adaptation to multifaceted shocks such as drought, food shortage, loss of livestock, flooding and bankruptcy. According to Fre this lack of contextualization can explain the negative and significant difference in income and saving between PSNP beneficiary and non-beneficiary households (i.e. non-beneficiary households having higher incomes and savings). Adaptation to differences in priorities is one of the elements of contextualization. Fre outlines, for instance, that while in one of the villages studied the priority was safe drinking water for them and their animals, in another village people considered spate irrigation as the main priority. Overlooking these priorities can reduce interest, participation and commitment to the programme.

Community participation is not only important for a tailored design of the programme to reduce costs, it is also essential to establish a sense of ownership within a community and align with existing social structures (including informal social protection). This ownership can create more commitment among the local population and improve participation. The sense of ownership can be strengthened by allowing participation in a genuine dialogue in an early stage of programme design (Berhane et al., 2013).

Another way to improve community participation is through simplifying the complex and time-consuming systems (c.f. United Nations, 2018). This includes reducing administrative procedures and reduced paperwork, which can particularly benefit communities in informal settings. On the other hand, information provision needs to be improved for community members. Often, beneficiaries are unaware of their entitlements, the available schemes and the application processes. Information campaigns tailored to the needs of specific beneficiaries (e.g. their language) can help to increase access.

#### **4.1.5 Adequate legislative frameworks and institutions**

The APD on social protection in Kenya concluded that there is no overarching legislation on social protection for coordination of social protection schemes. As a result, actors tend to operate in isolation. In Kenya, this has resulted in the duplication of interventions between the national and

county governments, civil society organizations and communities (see, for instance,  Elbers et al., 2018). Furthermore, existing policies have not been fully operationalized and structures to implement legal frameworks are weak. In Uganda, the current social protection policy does not have an implementation strategy and is spearheaded by a weak ministry, which makes implementation difficult. In Uganda, institutional capacity and coordination at subnational levels is a major issue for effective implementation.

The Kenya APD proposed the development of comprehensive legislation and appropriate institutional frameworks for social protection to address coordination and implementation challenges. Such legislation could harmonize social protection programmes including cash transfers, bursaries and other social support components, link the efforts of key stakeholders in the social protection sector, reduce fragmentation, avoid duplication, build synergies, specify the roles of different actors, establish participatory monitoring and reporting systems, and enhance the sharing of information. Notably, the Kenyan government is developing a comprehensive legal framework on social protection and has established a single registry to verify all social protection beneficiaries of programmes implemented by the government and civil society organizations. Institutional coordination and collaboration in Uganda could involve expanding the mandate of the SAGE Secretariat and local government structures; harmonizing the activities of the Social Protection Authority, Uganda Beneficiary and Regulatory Authority, and other institutions; and offering the Social Protection Authority the leading role.

#### **4.1.6 Promoting evidence-based policy making**

Promoting evidence-based policy making on social protection can have various positive impacts. First, it can inform policymakers of the range of positive impacts that social protection programmes can have (see chapter 2) and provide options for developing social protection schemes. Second, it can improve the implementation and coordination of existing and new policies. Third, it can stimulate the integration of social protection (with other social policies) to optimize the cost effectiveness of various programmes (see sections 3.3 and 3.4). Finally, an evidence-based policy-making process can prevent capture of social policies by the political elite by improving transparency and accountability. Yet, 'evidence' is not neutral, and can also be used by elites to increase their legitimacy.

According to the conclusions of the APDs in Kenya and Uganda, one of the factors that limit the impact of current social protection programmes is the limited use of research evidence in social protection policies and programmes. For example, in Uganda, the success of government initiatives is measured based on budgets and outputs, rather than on outcomes based on rigorous evidence, and the interventions in place lack an inbuilt impact evaluation mechanism. In Kenya, there are difficulties in getting policymakers to read policy briefs and/or attend evidence discussion forums.

To enhance the use of research evidence in social protection policy formulation and implementation, Utafiti Sera on social protection in Kenya documented lessons learnt from the engagement process. First, factors that enhance research uptake include the appropriateness of recommendations for the local political context, credibility of research evidence, involvement of policymakers, and persistent, consistent and timely provision of evidence. Second, researchers should appreciate the art of policy making in a country and recognize that technocrats read and get information from various sources to inform policies and strategy discussions. Third, the dissemination of research findings is as important as the generation of findings. Therefore, it is imperative to seek networks of researchers, policymakers, media persons and practitioners through the process. Fourth, actors are much more actively involved in dialogue processes when they play a specific role. In other words, involvement builds greater awareness and ownership of evidence. Note that politics is key in decision making and not just involvement. The media is an integral actor in setting the agenda and effectively disseminating research evidence to policy actors. Care needs to be taken on the type of media used for specific research evidence and the timing of publication. Fifth, the enactment of policies is not necessarily related to improved services. The major requirements and provisions of laws and policies have to be fully enforced. Sixth, researchers must understand when and how study findings are packaged for dissemination to different audiences.

It remains to be seen if promoting evidence-based policy making also makes social protection programmes more inclusive. The main question here is under which conditions can sharing evidence and promoting evidence-based policy discussions improve the coordination and implementation of social protection. However, sharing the various positive evaluations of social protection programmes could increase support for social protection among policymakers. For instance, Filipski et al. (2016) found that, because of the large share of donors in the financing of the PSNP, there are large rates of

return on the Ethiopian birr spent by the Ethiopian government on the PSNP. The government could, thus, increase its share of PSNP costs considerably, while still reaping a large economic return.

#### 4.2 Interactions between formal and informal social protection

The INCLUDE concept note on social protection identifies the interactions between formal and informal social protection as a gap in the literature, mentioning the possible crowding out or easing of pressure on informal arrangements by formal transfers (Gassmann, 2014). To date, there is still little evidence on the relationship between private informal transfers and formal safety nets. However, the past years have brought about interesting discoveries regarding the interaction of social transfers with informal savings and credit groups in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Informal savings and credit groups are very common in Africa, especially in East African countries. Given that poor households often face barriers of access to formal financial services, these groups can provide credit and savings opportunities. However, these groups also require some contribution, which excludes the poorest of the poor from participating. Kuss et al. (2018) found that the Senior Citizens Grant in Uganda allowed recipients to join village savings groups by enabling them to contribute. In addition to enabling beneficiaries to join rotating savings and credit groups, it was reported that the value of the pay outs of these groups also increased due to cash transfers. An impact evaluation of Uganda's SAGE cash transfers by Merttens et al. (2016) also found an increase in village savings groups membership among beneficiaries. A similar impact was noted by Stoeffler et al. (2017) in their study on productive investment effects in Niger, where participants of the pilot cash transfer project increased their membership of informal savings and credit groups, by Pouw et al. (2017) in their evaluation of the impacts of the NHIS and LEAP in Ghana, and by Kuss and Gassmann (2018) in their evaluation of the impact of SAGE on remote areas.

#### 4.3 Creating a strategic context

Strategic contexts and the political economy for social protection have remained an untapped territory in contemporary research. However, three studies on the topic provide insights:

- First, Yi (2015) draws insights from the political, institutional and historic dynamics shaping the welfare states of three East Asian countries. Based on case studies from Japan, Taiwan and Korea, the paper challenges the notion that integrated and coordinated welfare systems

are a luxury that only the wealthiest countries can afford. Instead, historic factors and the uneven development trajectory of the institutional infrastructure of different sectors (e.g. health, education, social assistance, pension systems) have affected the current degree of comprehensiveness and integration of public service provision. It is also noted that fragmentation does not necessarily hinder wide coverage of the population, if adequate funding is given and institutions are well-governed and coordinated.

- The importance of accountability for social protection in any strategic context is highlighted by Rohwerder (2016). It is argued in this desk review on civil society organizations and cash transfer transparency, that third-party monitoring, advocacy and facilitation can be a positive complement to (but not a substitution for) state mechanisms.
- A study performed by Snyder and Yackovlev (2000) on the political and economic determinants of investments in social protection in the United States, Latin American and the Caribbean shows the differences in decisive factors between countries. For instance, the authors found differences in investments in response to macroeconomic shocks. While in Brazil expenditure on programmes has been pro-cyclic, in Colombia they appear counter-cyclic. This can be explained by the extent of the shock: the severity of the economic crisis in Brazil in the 1980s forced the government to cut spending. The authors also confirm that social spending increases more under democratic rule than under authoritarian rule. This links the issue of social protection investments to broader political discussions on the importance of democracy.

Cultivating political will is critical for social protection, because governments determine development priorities, including social protection. Such will can be generated by creating a demand for social protection from the grassroots to ensure that it becomes a political agenda. Political will ensures that social protection is prioritized in national planning and budgeting. Although economic and political crises can reduce spending on social protection, they can also create the political pressure to increase efforts. The APDs in Kenya have shown, for instance, that political parties are inclined to include social protection in their campaigns in the run-up to elections. Hence, making use of political momenta, such as political crises, can be the strategic context required to promote social protection. Finally, recognition of the importance of ownership by national governments is essential. On the other hand, one of the conclusions of the seminar 'Leaving no one behind through social protection' is that waiting for national governments to be fully convinced, willing and capable of investing in

large scale programmes may not be desirable. Participants argued that programmes can commence and trust and ownership can be built over time (Van Kesteren et al., 2016).

## 5. Conclusion

This synthesis report has reviewed the evidence base on three main questions regarding the contribution of social protection to inclusive growth, the cost effectiveness of social protection programmes and their coordination and implementation. The RIDSSA research projects have contributed to the compelling evidence base on the contribution of social protection to inclusive growth. However, the extent to which social protection is able to do so depends on various factors internal to the design and implementation of the programme (such as size and duration of the programme) and external factors (such as the socio-economic context of the intervention). This review has provided insights into the question under which conditions the contribution of social protection to inclusive growth can be optimized. This chapter provides a summary of main findings.

### 5.1. Social protection and inclusive growth: medium and long-term impact

At the household level, many impact evaluations show the contributions that social protection can have on intermediate indicators of inclusive growth. The majority of evaluations shows positive outcomes for food security, consumption, education, health, psychological wellbeing, asset accumulation, savings, labour and income. However, in the long term these impacts may be different: effects increase or dissipate, and other households can catch up or lag behind. While some evaluations show positive impacts in the long term, several evaluations show that non-beneficiary households eventually catch up with beneficiary households. Higher, more regular and predictable transfers over a longer duration are likely to improve long-term outcomes. More research is required to provide robust explanations for differences in long-term impact.

At the community level, most evaluations show the positive effects of transfers on the local economy. A transfer of USD 1 results in an average increase in income of USD 0.08–0.81 in the local economy, when accounting for inflation. However, inflation rates cannot be attributed to social protection interventions, and are more likely to be caused by high national levels of inflation.

Social protection can also strengthen social ties within communities. Various evaluations have found increases in (informal) village savings schemes, sharing arrangements, and informal in-kind support, as well as new or strengthened social networks. However, negative social effects have also been found, such as the erosion of networks and trust in formal institutions when targeted transfers are perceived as unfair.

Explanations for differences in impact can be found in factors external or internal to interventions. External, exogenous factors of success can include (higher) pre-transfer levels of social and human capital, access to services, levels of market integration, sources of livelihood and employment opportunities. At the macro level, the quality and availability of social policies, such as free education, infrastructure development and good governance, are important. Regarding factors internal to (the design) of the programme, the only clear outcome is that higher transfers lead to better outcomes. The effect of factors, such as the payment modality and duration of the programme, is dependent on the context of implementation. This confirms the fact that there is no 'silver bullet' that will bring about the same positive changes in all settings. Programmes that are able to resonate with the specific needs, risks and vulnerabilities of the target population are most likely to be successful.

Evaluations that show positive impacts on intermediate factors of inclusive growth do not necessarily show positive outcomes for vulnerable groups, including the extreme poor, children, women, the elderly and people living in remote areas. In fact, inadequate targeting can result in increased levels of inequality. Reaching the extreme poor is challenging. Several evaluations with positive results on average, show little or no improvement for the extreme poor. High transaction costs (i.e. registration in the programme, physical distance from the implementing institution, etc.), lack of quality information and the inability of programmes to address the specific socio-cultural and psychosocial constraints of the extreme poor are some of the reasons why social protection programmes have failed to reach the extreme poor.

In the debate on universal or targeted programmes, there is some evidence emerging that universal programmes reach the poor better than targeted programmes. The outcomes of cost-benefit analyses of both types of programmes depend on various factors. These include the range of benefits evaluated (i.e. how many indicators are assessed), the extent to which hidden costs (such as additional costs incurred by households, but also leakage to the non-poor and imperfect coverage of poor households) and hidden benefits (indirect benefits and spillover effects to other populations)

are assessed, the timeframe used for the evaluation, the transfer size, and the extent to which additional weight is given to redistribution to (extremely) poor households.

Research shows that both universal programmes and programmes targeted at children (such as school feeding programmes), women (such as public works programmes) and the elderly (social pensions) have large positive outcomes, particularly in the long term. Programmes improving access to quality education and reducing child labour can have large, long-lasting impacts for children. Investments in infrastructure such as quality roads and mobile phone networks are needed to improve access to social protection for people in remote areas.

## 5.2. Cost effectiveness

The number of studies measuring the cost effectiveness of social protection programmes is limited, but most point to the benefits outweighing the costs. Generally, cost-benefit ratios are negative in the start-up phase of the programme (usually in the first 15 months), and become (more) positive over time. Projections of future costs and benefits find ratios improving with the duration of the programme, as well as when indirect benefits, such as the future benefits of education, are included. When comparing the cost effectiveness of various programmes, it appears that programmes integrating various social protection instruments (e.g. cash transfers and asset trainings) or social protection with other social policies (e.g. combining free maternal health care with improving the quality of health clinics) have higher value for money than single interventions. It also appears that cash transfers have high cost-benefit ratios, compared to e.g. food vouchers or asset transfers. However, the most cost-effective modality depends on contextual factors and the timeframe of the evaluation. For instance, in-kind food transfers are more appropriate when markets are not functioning, while cash transfers are usually preferred if markets are functioning. Evaluations of graduation programmes that integrate interventions sequentially throughout the programme show positive results.

In general, improving the wellbeing of extremely poor households is more costly than social intervention programmes that target other populations. This is because it is difficult to target the extreme poor, and alleviating their constraints requires multifaceted programmes. Hence, programmes aimed at the extreme poor may be perceived as less cost effective. This implies a trilemma: the objectives of cost effectiveness, universality and the targeting vulnerable groups appear to be difficult to combine. A different picture of benefits may arise if redistribution and the reduction of inequality are given additional value.

Only a few studies have empirically tested interaction effects between different social protection interventions, and with mixed results. Positive interaction effects would justify investment in joint, instead of separate, programmes. In general, studies of interaction effects between social protection and other social policies (such as providing financial training or counselling to traumatized women) show positive results. Behaviour change communication particularly appears to contribute to large effects of cash transfers. In addition, effective coordination and implementation can improve synergies between programmes.

### **5.3. Coordination and implementation**

The cost effectiveness of social protection programmes is often hindered by imperfect coordination and implementation. Seven main factors affecting coordination and implementation have been identified. First, African countries need to fill gaps in the financing of social protection programmes. Second, the delivery of transfers and information can be smoothed by improved payment modalities and stronger implementing institutions. Third, vertical governance can be improved through legal measures to establish clear roles and responsibilities between levels of government, improved structures for monitoring and evaluation, and improved cooperation with informal institutions such as traditional authorities. Fourth, community participation needs to be improved in order to adapt programmes to local contexts (such as seasonal circumstances or local agricultural schemes) and the priorities of different populations. Sixth, adequate legislative frameworks and institutions can make the implementation of programmes more efficient. If not, actors often operate in isolation and may duplicate actions or interventions at various levels. Finally, the promotion of evidence-based policy making can contribute to more cost-effective social protection, as it creates more awareness about the potential benefits of social protection, can improve the implementation and coordination of existing and new policies, and can prevent elite capture.

The political space for such improvements depends on whether a strategic context exists or can be created. In this regard, ownership by national governments is essential for long-term commitment to social protection. In a broad sense, ownership allows for a social contract between the state and its citizens and the redistribution of public domestic resources. The political will for such a context can be cultivated by creating a demand for social protection from the grassroots, particularly among the upcoming middle class in Sub-Saharan Africa. Windows of opportunity, such as political elections or economic crises, can create momentum and exert political pressure for social protection.



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## Annex 1. Findings of RIDSSA research projects and APDs

**Table A1. Impacts of LEAP and NHIS in Ghana**

	Difference in difference results for LEAP and NHIS				
		Full sample	Poor	Extreme poor	
Per capita food consumption	LEAP	0.198 ***	0.091 ***	-0.017	
	NHIS	0.006	0.046 **	0.196 ***	
Per capita medicine expenditure	LEAP	6.148 **	6.574 **	9.900 ***	
	NHIS	16.694 ***	2.535 ***	2.882 ***	
Child weight-for-age	LEAP	0.337 **	0.555 **	0.628 *	
	NHIS	0.007	0.021	0.720 *	
Child height-for-age	LEAP	-0.026	0.090	-0.228	
	NHIS	0.353 **	0.600 ***	0.430	
Child weight-for-height	LEAP	0.987 ***	1.102 **	0.950	
	NHIS	1.311 ***	0.856 **	0.754	
Subjective health	LEAP	0.072 ***	0.113 ***	0.132 ***	
	NHIS	0.012	0.040 **	0.033	
Per capita land size	LEAP	-0.045	0.131 **	0.291 ***	
	NHIS	0.143 *	0.552 ***	0.928 ***	
Worker status: in work	LEAP	-0.177	-0.195	-0.345	
	NHIS	-0.040	-0.069	-0.226	
Worker status: unemployed	LEAP	-0.084 ***	0.081 ***	0.079	
	NHIS	-0.022	-0.048	-0.051	

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\*p<0.05 \*p<0.1

Source: Based on Pouw et al., 2017

**Table A2. Likelihood of participation in the PSNP in Afar region of Ethiopia**

Variables	Odds ratio	dy/dx
Sex (1=m/ 0=f)	-0.148	-0.059**(0.024)
Age	0.006	0.002**(0.001)
Education	-0.122	-0.049* (0.028)
Marital status (1=y/ 0=n)	-0.062	-0.025 (0.025)
Household size	0.028	0.011**(0.005)
Livelihood type	0.335	0.132***(0.022)

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\*p<0.05 \*p<0.1

Source: Based on Fre, 2018

**Table A3. Impact of PSNP on Afar households in Ethiopia using four algorithms**

Algorithm	Income	Savings	Consumption	Livestock	Fixed asset value
Nearest neighbour	-2.304*	-4.407***	0.957	-2.304*	1.108
Stratification	-3.389***	-2.672**	1.547	-3.389***	1.403
Radius	-2.052*	-4.054***	1.059	-2.052*	0.826
Kernel	-3.492***	-4.65***	2.060*	-3.492***	1.684

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\*p<0.05 \*p<0.1

Source: Based on Fre, 2018

**Table A4. Effect of AICs and WII on productivity, in addition to PSNP in Tigray, Ethiopia**

Indicators	Transfers (400 Ethiopian birr)	Transfers (200 Ethiopian birr) + insurance (300 Ethiopian birr)
<b>Agricultural production:</b>		
● Seeds purchased	111.49***	67.55**
● Fertilizer purchased	70.51	33.05
● Tools purchased	12.03*	5.25
● Herbicide and pesticide purchased	3.34	-0.14
● Total inputs purchased	197.36*	105.71
<b>Land use:</b>		
● Farmland used	0.12	0.16
● Farmland rented in	0.11**	0.19***
● Farmland rented out	-0.12**	-0.05
● Farmland fallow	-0.06*	-0.04
<b>Labour:</b>		
● Labour days on land preparation	-1.24**	-0.37
● Labour days on sowing	-0.75*	-0.59*
● Labour days on cultivation	-0.05	-2.05
● Labour days on harvesting	-0.79	0.13
● Total labour days on farm work	-2.84	-2.88
● Cost of hiring farm labour	97.73*	15.66

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\*p<0.05 \*p<0.1

Source: Based on Wong et al., forthcoming

**Table A5. Impacts of cash transfers, counselling and SHLCPTS on psychological wellbeing in Northern Uganda**

	P-value (empowerment)	P-value (worry)	P-value (trauma)
<b>First wave:</b>			
Cash/in-kind	0.017**	0.023**	
Counselling	0.04**	0.535	
Cash/in-kind*counselling	0.723	0.003***	
<b>Second wave:</b>			
Cash/in-kind	0.225	0.337	0.002***
Counselling	0.020**	0.401	0.233
Cash/in-kind*counselling	0.058*	0.200	0.400
<b>Second wave (with SHLCPTS):</b>			
SHLCPTS	0.350	0.891	0.194
Cash/in-kind*SHLCPTS	0.295	0.264	0.285
Counselling*SHLCPTS	0.529	0.315	0.947

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\*p<0.05 \*p<0.1

Source: Van Reisen et al., 2018

**Table A6. Interaction effects of LEAP and NHIS in Ghana**

Difference in difference results for the interaction effect between LEAP and NHIS			
	Full sample	Poor	Extreme poor
Per capita food consumption	0.149***	0.080***	0.046**
Per capita medicine expenditure	0.177	1.696**	4.958***
Child weight-for-age	0.568***	0.610***	1.282**
Child height-for-age	0.356**	0.666***	0.455*
Child weight-for-height	0.664**	0.494*	0.703
Subjective health	0.073***	0.121***	0.123***
Per capita land size	-0.094	0.144**	0.324***
Worker status: in work	-0.097	-0.133	-0.271
Worker status: unemployed	-0.007	-0.012	0.019

Note: \*\*\* p<0.01 \*\*p<0.05 \*p<0.1

Source: Based on Pouw et al., 2017

**Table A7. Participation in insurance under different subsidy levels in Tigray, Ethiopia**

Participation in WII	Received PSNP transfer in year 1	Received PSNP transfer and WII in year 1

Received 90% insurance in year 2	0.84***	0.90***
Received 80% insurance in year 2	0.69***	0.78***
Received 70% insurance in year 2	0.59***	0.71***
Received 60% insurance in year 2	0.42***	0.46***
Received 50% insurance in year 2	0.34***	0.41***
Received 40% insurance in year 2	0.14***	0.17***
Note: *** p<0.01 **p<0.05 *p<0.1		

Source: Wong et al., 2018

**Table A8. Budgeted costs of implementation of social protection programmes per category**

Sub-category	2015/2016	2016/2017	2017/2018	2018/19	2019/20
	In billion Ugandan shillings				
Direct income support	76.16	106.50	117.81	125.22	133.58
Contributory social security	10.96	9.75	10.08	10.04	10.04
Social care and support services	4.99	6.34	6.72	6.75	6.70

Source: Ssewanyana et al., 2017

## Annex 2. Overview – African Policy Dialogues on social protection

### **Utafiti Sera on social protection in Kenya**

‘Utafiti Sera’ brings together researchers, policymakers, practitioners and the media to ensure that new and existing research evidence on social protection is available to policymakers and practitioners and is used by policymakers at both national and county levels of government. In 2015, this APD contributed ideas to the draft ‘Social Protection Bill’, including the definition of social protection, and to the establishment of a ‘Social Protection Authority’. This APD has also enhanced awareness of social protection policies among national and county governments.

### **Women’s entrepreneurship and social protection in Uganda**

This APD was established to increase awareness of the need to pay special attention to women’s entrepreneurship and social protection and to promote interventions that consider gender, geography and the lifecycle of the target groups. To achieve this, the dialogue has generated two synthesis reports and three policy briefs on women’s entrepreneurship and social protection and mapped key actors to enhance their advocacy. This APD supported the INCLUDE research groups in Uganda with a platform to reach policymakers; advocated for appropriate strategies to invest in women’s entrepreneurship and social protection in forums with the Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development’s Expanding Social Protection programme and contributed to the programme’s research agenda; and shared evidence on country-specific evidence on what works and does not work in women’s entrepreneurship programmes and social protection in Uganda with policymakers.